Europe’s Chance to Rally: Saving the International Order

AI-generated image, ChatGPT (DALL·E), royalty-free. Free for use. © OpenAI / OpenAI Content Policy

Introduction

'The United States is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that’s just a fact.'

One could be forgiven for assuming this quote was just one more in the flurry of sensationalist phrases President Trump has said since his inauguration. The statement carries his signature bluntness and brazen disregard for the niceties that undergird the liberal, rules-based international order. It reflects his disdain for what he sees as the self-neutering of the United States and the foolish taboo on using its hard power to mold the world according to its wishes, instead deferring to international norms and etiquette such as 'You can’t feud with allies.'

Yet, this quote does not come from Trump. Instead, it is a slightly modified version of Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi’s declaration at the ASEAN Regional Forum in 2010. It was a rebuke to the Southeast Asian countries’ audacity to complain about China’s expansionist policies in the South China Sea.

Trump’s comments have been eerily similar. At the fraught meeting between Zelensky and Trump in the Oval Office following a week of hostile comments, Trump berated the Ukrainian president for presuming to lecture the U.S., '...You got to be more thankful, because, let me tell you, you don’t have the cards. With us, you have the cards, but without us, you don’t have any cards.' 

The statement was a reminder to Zelensky that Ukraine was but a small country, with no place to influence the foreign policy decisions of its superiors. More so than that, however, the statement was a sign of America’s departure from the international system that has presided over a period of remarkable cooperation and a dominant liberal ideology for the past several decades. Whereas Biden, the epitome of liberal foreign policy in terms of stalwartly safeguarding global democracy and America’s allies, envisioned and defended Ukraine in its war as a bastion of good versus evil, Trump cares little for Ukraine being forced to cede part of its sovereign territory in a potential peace deal –traditionally a non-starter for international law. He, himself, has expressed intent to expand America’s territory by military means.

This break in precedent leads to the pressing question: in a world not only devoid of American leadership but replete with American aggression, will the rules-based international order survive? The answer depends on the ability of an emerging Europe to seize the opportunity to achieve foreign policy autonomy alongside its military renaissance and to capitalise on its competitive advantage as an established, staunch defender of the liberal order.

A Moment of Global Redefinition

There is wide agreement among foreign policy commentators that we are at a moment of global redefinition for the international system. Though it is comforting to hope for a chance to return to diplomatic normalcy after four years of Trumpism, or the so-called MAGA movement, such a reversal is unlikely. Governments will not forget the world Trump is offering a glimpse into – a world of unbridled American power wielded in the pursuit of American-centric goals. Despite Europe traditionally being America’s closest ally, Friedrich Merz, the Chancellor-elect of Germany, recently said, 'My absolute priority will be to strengthen Europe as quickly as possible so that step by step, we can really achieve independence from the USA.' In their eyes at least, the U.S. has proven itself irrevocably unreliable.

With analysts sounding the death knell for the territorial sovereignty-respecting, international law-heeding global order, the question then is: What will be the system that will define the next era of international politics? 

Nils Gilman, a historian and the executive vice president and chief operating officer of the Berggruen Institute, recently asserted in Foreign Policy that, historically, the succeeding order can be traced in its making to seeds planted much earlier. Using this logic and referencing Huntington’s famous dissertation, Gilman made the case that the next iteration of the international order will be defined by zero-sum transactionalism, Thucydidean power politics, and, most importantly, '“muscular assertions of identitarian politics centred on "civilizational states."'

Yet, in arguing for “civilizational” groups being the preeminent determinants of future international relations, Gilman ignores a much more obvious historical parallel. Not only has there been an increase in middle-power collaboration between countries like France, the Philippines, and India (across, rather than divided by, “civilizational” lines), Trump’s promise to “Make America Great Again” leaves little room for its “civilizational” brethren, if such a thing even exists. To make a better comparison, the precedents Trump is creating through his actions are reflections of what China sought to create in its period of “wolf warrior diplomacy.”

The World China Wants

Xi Jinping’s rise to power brought about fundamental changes to the way China interacted with the world and the international order. Previously, Deng Xiaoping’s dogma of “hide one's talent and bide one's time” (韬光养晦) dominated Chinese foreign policy from 1976 onwards. The policy stressed less ideological interactions with the world after decades of Mao Zedong’s attempt to export the revolution abroad isolated China diplomatically from its neighbors. 

Deng Xiaoping managed to lead China out of the iron grip of Maoist dogma through the famous “crossing the river by touching the stones” policy (摸着石头过河), but the battered nation was not yet powerful enough to compete with America’s dominating influence on the international stage. By latching onto international institutions and the free trade system, the country saw a period of miraculous economic expansion, achieving one of the most successful alleviation of poverty programmes in history. After 30 years of explosive growth, Xi Jinping came to power alongside an ideology that China was, at last, ready to assert itself and let its voice be heard. This new era of ‘Xin Xing’ (新型), or “New Ways,” marked a significant shift in China’s foreign policy.

One of the most prominent of the “New Ways” was an aggressive assertion of Chinese strength that eventually became known as “wolf warrior diplomacy,” as its most obvious outlet was Chinese diplomats’ vitriolic attitudes and complete disregard for diplomatic niceties. Yang Jiechi’s famous assertion of “might makes right” at the ASEAN assembly is one prominent example among countless others.

The goal of this increased assertiveness was to bend the international order into something more favorable to the Chinese Communist Party. There was plenty China enjoyed economically under the rules-based global order; yet, certain issues, most prominently the liberal insistence on democracy and protecting individualistic human rights, irked the politically insecure party. Ever fearful of threats of regime change from what it saw as a hostile American agenda, Chinese officials sought to drive an emphasis on national sovereignty, an assertion of noninterference in internal matters, as the preeminent international norm. In the world China wanted, nongovernmental organisations monitoring human rights would have no place abroad and all political systems would be equally legitimate.

National sovereignty took on a different characteristic, however, when Chinese officials saw its national security and interests threatened. When the CCP feared losing political sway over Tibet, when China decided the islands in the South China Sea could become valuable security installations, when countries defaulted on exorbitant Chinese loans, in these instances the “big country” did as it wished with disregard for the interests of the small countries. 

In essence, these wolf warrior diplomats wanted a global order that permitted China to do whatever it wanted in and out of the country without backlash over global norms. These global norms, epitomised by the rules-based international order, were seen as unfairly restraining a country fixed on national renewal, at home and abroad.

After several years, Xi Jinping abandoned this aggression for a new round of charm offences as Chinese assertiveness only pushed countries deeper into the American fold. The policy had been built on a belief that the United States was a waning global power, and China would soon eclipse it in terms of economic, technological, and military prominence. Yet, a resilient America remained, and China once again saw itself becoming diplomatically isolated. Since then, Chinese actions may have changed little – it continues to escalate in the South China Sea and sponsor cyberattacks against civilian infrastructure; but, officials have significantly toned down their language, now in all but action sounding like advocates for multilateralism and the liberal order.

Chinese officials gave up their hopes of forcibly building a pliable international order; but, through his “America First” policies, Trump may be doing it for them.

The Future of the Global Order – and Europe’s Chance

Trump, through incredibly similar action and rhetoric, seems to want the same international order that Xi Jinping pushed for ten years ago. He similarly feels the norms of the liberal order – respect for territorial sovereignty, multilateral collaboration, global free trade, and insistence on democratic superiority – are restricting and inhibiting American priorities. At their core, both leaders believe in and seek to realise the exceptional nature of their respective country. If his words are to be taken at face value, he wants to annex the Panama Canal, he is considering military action to secure control over Greenland’s geostrategic position, and he has imposed global tariffs to harbor American industry.

If there are disagreements between the United States and its democratic allies, he will threaten disproportionate economic damage until their leaders sign a deal. If no deal is reached, Trump will abandon them altogether, and even securing a deal is no guarantee of partnership – as Mexico and Canada recently found out.

If Trump gets his way, the next international order will be what China has so long desired, even if the country had hoped to be one of its first beneficiaries, rather than victims. Despite the tensions, some analysts – such as the author of this Foreign Affairs article – believe Trump still wants a world split into “spheres of influence” shared with China. This new order will be transactional, brimming with Thucydidean power politics. “National security” will be the order of the day, and anything and everything will be fair game to a country pursuing this goal. Everything will come under the purview of national security – supply chains, technological networks, and other country’s internal politics, and there will be no niceties or norms to protect those with fewer resources. Such a global environment would spell disaster for a fractured and feeble European Union.

Yet, Trump is not alone and the United States is not unipolar; American retrenchment from the rules-based international order provides a unique opportunity for the rest of the world to claim ownership of the global system and to rebuild it more durable than it could ever be under the stewardship of one country. And, none more so than a united Europe may have the political capital to take on this onerous task.

Already, a seemingly economically and diplomatically hostile America – perhaps best seen in VP Vance’s attack on Europe’s democratic institutions at the Munich Security Conference – has driven European leaders to reconsider assumptions of their eternal security under an American military umbrella. In response, Ursula von der Leyen, among others, pledged to dramatically increase military spending. Yet, the European Union must take this moment to go further, more seriously reconsidering and outlining an independent foreign policy.

Europe has not always fallen in line with America’s global initiatives – much of the continent expressed opposition to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003; but, for the past half decade, European leaders have placed themselves as ideological allies of the United States. Despite not always being in their own interests, they have supported U.S. policies such as the technological blockade of China when they have been sufficiently couched in rhetoric of defending the liberal international order. 

The U.S. is departing from such rhetoric, but Europe continues to speak and, importantly, act in these terms. To justify increased defence spending, von der Leyen highlighted 'European values such as democracy and the rule of law were under threat in an increasingly ‘transactional’ world.' The continent is well known for its leadership in committing to Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) principles in its business dealings, and it has placed international cooperation at the centre of its actions abroad, such as leading international efforts to rehabilitate and stabilise the new Syrian state. The bloc already realises many of the international order’s ideals in practice, but it must now cement its position as an outspoken advocate for the global order. Without a concerted effort to promulgate a defence of the order abroad, it may not survive an unbridled American agenda.

This is not to say there are not serious hurdles standing in the way of the European Union’s full embrace of stewardship of the international order. Perhaps most importantly, the Union is currently splitting between institutional and populist forces, with the latter demanding an American-style withdrawal from global responsibilities. Populists have already taken power in Hungary and Italy and are pushing for greater decentralisation within the bloc. Second, as descendants of criminally brutal, global empires, many of Europe’s states carry colonial legacies which they refuse to apologise for, dampening relations and their legitimacy with Global South countries.

These roadblocks will require serious attention. Trump’s aggression has seemingly reinforced domestic support for previously waning institutional parties – temporarily bolstering Macron and Starmer; but, at least for now, historical apologies seem to be out of the cards. The good news for Europe: just as Trump’s actions have reignited new desires for greater integration within the bloc, American foreign policy on the global stage may provide opportunities for the Union to establish itself as a defender of global norms against an predatory environment of “might makes right,” if it is able to muster the political capital to do so. Already, the EU has expedited efforts to expand its global linkages, such as through a potential EU-Mercosur trade deal.

The rules-based international order and Europe’s geopolitical position are in perhaps their worst state since the end of World War 2. Yet, the European Union may have the opportunity to save two birds with one policy. If it is able to extend its drive for military revitalization to establish a new foreign policy grand strategy, it can place itself as the defender of a more inclusive and reformed global order. This isn’t to say the European Union will be able to replace the United States’ role as the sole guarantor – it does not nearly have the resources nor will to do so; but, if it can lead a drive to build a global coalition by championing a democratization of global rights and responsibilities, it can preserve a geopolitical environment safe for its future.

This article does not necessarily reflect the opinions of European Guanxi, its leadership, members, partners, or stakeholders, nor of those of its editors or staff. They have been formulated by the author in their full capacity, and shall not be used for any other purposes other than those they are intended for. European Guanxi assumes no liability or responsibility deriving from the improper use of the contents of this report. Any false facts, errors, and controversial opinions contained in the articles are proper and exclusive of the authors. European Guanxi or its staff and collaborators cannot be held responsible or legally liable for the use of any and all information contained in this document.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Austin Nellessen is a graduate from Georgetown University, where he focused on the intersection of international affairs, politics, and history, as well as US-China relations. A commentator on current international affairs, Austin is also the Director of ATLAS, a publication he founded to platform innovative ideas and challenge traditional thinking. Alongside professional experience using his Chinese language proficiency to conduct research at the Hudson Institute on Chinese domestic and foreign policy, Austin currently is Chief of Staff and Program Manager for M+D Advisors, a consultancy organizing the world’s biggest conferences.

This article was edited by Sardor Allayarov and Douglas Brenton Anderson.