Presidential and legislative election in the Republic of China (Taiwan) were celebrated on the 13th of January 2024. This event marked the election of the 16th-term president and vice president, or, in other words, the 8th democratic presidential election in all of Taiwan’s history since 1996, and the constitutive election for the 11th Legislative Yuan (MOFA, 2024).
Hours after closing the voting ballot box at 4 p.m., the Central Election Comission confirmed the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP/Green) under Lai Ching-te with 40.05% of the votes as the leader party, closely followed by its traditional competitor, the Kuomintang (KMT/Blue) led by Hou Yu-ih, with 33.49% of the votes. Finally, falling behind was Ko Wen-je’s Taiwan People’s Party (TPP/White), which only garnered 26.46%. This result means that the DPP won, and the new president and vice-president will be, respectively, candidates Lai Ching-te and Hsiao Bi-khim (Hsu, 2024).
Despite this year's low turnout for Taiwan’s elections, at only 71.86%, this has been one of the most closely-observed elections with increasing expectations from neighbouring states and Taiwan’s international allies. Now that the results have been made public, Taiwan’s 12 diplomatic allies and other partners of Taiwanese democracy congratulated the new president and vice president on this victory. Notably, for the first time, there will be a close observation of the continuity of the same political party in its third term, assessing the developments within the Taiwanese government amidst an increasingly tense international scenario (Hsu, 2024).
Regarding the new composition of the Legislative Yuan, the Central Election Commission revealed that the Democratic Progressive Party lost its majority, retaining only 51 seats out of the previous 62. Meanwhile, the Kuomintang became the most prominent party with 52 seats, and the Taiwan People's Party increased its past results gaining eight seats (Hsu, 2024). The two remaining seats were occupied by two independent legislators (former KMT Legislator Chen Chao-ming and lawmaker Kao Chin Su-mei), both lean towards the KMT (Hsiao, 2024). This result is another significant event in the election as it marks the first time since 2004 that no party holds a majority, with 57 seats, in the legislative power (Cantor Tepal, 2024).
What to expect from the third term under the Democratic Progressive Party
The presidential elections have provided a unique opportunity to maintain DPP policies, ensuring the continuation of a national policy based on the de-facto separation that the former president, Tsai Ing-wen, has promoted during the past eight years. Even so, the Greens' victory under the current conditions, retaining presidential power but losing the legislative majority, offers two unique insights into what we can expect from these results.
Firstly, the victory is unlikely to defuse tensions with China, and coercion tactics will continue being part of the Taiwanese reality, ranging from military to economic and international isolation. Particularly considering that, analogously to Tsai Ing-wen, Lai Ching-te is likely to be open to dialogue with Beijing while still preserving the status quo in the cross-strait relations without compromising Taiwan's sovereignty, meaning it is impossible to give open acceptance to the 1992 Consensus.
But why is so important to accept this consensus for Beijing-Taipei dialogue? This concept was coined by KMT politician Su Chi to describe the historical discussion on the "One China Principle" (Shih, 2006). Despite its name, it lacks legal binding and fails to represent a genuine consensus. Instead, it should be viewed as a strategic formula to allow the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and KMT to set aside their differing views on which government holds legitimacy. Both acknowledge the existence of "one China" and consider Taiwan part of it while differing on the legitimacy of government. Conversely, Beijing's current narrative presents this consensus as embodying its own "One China Principle," emphasising that Taiwan is part of it, and the Popular Republic of China (PRC) is the sole legitimate government representing all of China (Chen & Cohen, 2019).
The second insight requires a history review – the first DPP presidency in 2000 with Chen Shuibian's victory. At the beginning of his first term, the government faced opposition from the KMT in the Legislative Yuan, a situation that could potentially repeat itself in this term with a potential KMT-TPP alliance. The inability to collaborate with the legislative power, coupled with delegitimisation from China, led to the derailment of Chen’s intentions for cross-strait potential talks and cooperation with the mainland. Faced with this scenario, he approached the upcoming elections in 2004 by mobilising the support of the more pro-independence branch of the DPP and adopting an open pro-Taiwanese way of action, which ultimately secured his victory in a second term (Li, 2023).
This pattern was repeated with Tsai Ing-wen from 2016 to 2024, who initially called for dialogue but, perceiving it as futile, transitioned to a more detached policy towards China in her second term. If the scenario and politics once again lead to a lack of cooperation, these dynamics may be observed with the new government.
Considering these two points for the DPP, this new green term can be expected to sustain investment in national security by strengthening defence, self-sufficiency, and maintaining the centrality of diplomacy and alliances with democratic nations (Hou, 2023). In addition, as mentioned above, the economy could suffer in sectors depending on the mainland, and Beijing undoubtedly has significant influence in Taiwanese entrepreneurs, both on the island and among the states on the continent. This situation makes it more necessary for the DPP to reduce dependence through trade agreements with like-minded democratic partners (Legarda and Vasselier, 2023).
Finally, when discussing Taiwan, the US is worth mentioning. With the complex geopolitical environment and the multiple fronts in which the US is currently involved, it will be necessary for the DPP to measure US capabilities and follow the coming presidential elections this November, especially if Donald Trump appears on the electoral table. Overall, and regardless of what will happen in the US elections, the victory of the DPP represents a national reaffirmation of further alignment with Washington and less with Beijing. the DPP’s victory represents a significant endorsement of the White House's strategy for the Asia-Pacific region, which will be followed by increased US support in all areas, particularly in the sale of military arms (Ríos, 2024). In addition, Lai's Taiwan reaffirms its relevance and importance as a pivotal reference for the United States in Asia and allies such as Japan or Australia (the latter being a member of the AUKUS partnership).
Importance of the Legislative Yuan results for the future government
The Legislative Yuan comprises 113 seats, with 57 being necessary to obtain the comfortable majority that a political party needs to make laws, treaties, approve the national budget, etc. Nevertheless, this year's elections left us with an unusual situation: a legislative without any clear winner.
The results of the elections leave the three major parties in a unique position. As was explained before, the DPP is uncomfortable compared to the majority that it enjoyed in its past term. However, with the mandatory necessity to establish more consensus among the parties, some analysts consider this a chance to offer some checks and balances for the greens and highlight the necessity for more communication among politicians. In the worst-case scenario, this legislative organ would become a constrictor of power for the presidential winner during the following years (Hart, 2024).
The KMT is the party with the most seats (52), albeit by a narrow margin of just one seat over the DPP. Yet, this result can only be translated into a real winning result with the support of the rising TPP. Political manoeuvring for the union of the two parties was attempted during the pre-electoral campaign with disastrous results. Therefore, it is not entirely clear what their modus operandi will be for establishing alliances over time.
The new indispensable actor within the legislative is represented by Ko Wen-je's TPP, whose critical minority of eight seats, compared to the five he had in 2020, can reduce the feeling of loss in the presidential elections. This slight increase in seats gives him a point of power over his two opponents, who will need to make compelling offers if they want the support of the TPP during the legislature. Therefore, he can be expected to take advantage of his critical position and garner attention in the legislative arena.
At present, after the inauguration of the Legislative Yuan on February 1st, one crucial event took place: the election of the new speaker and deputy speaker of the legislative power. This role is significant because even though the speaker, as a negotiator, is not allowed to get involved in party matters, they can influence the approval of the government bills. Therefore, this election can offer clues about the complexity of the parties’ post-electoral understanding and how dynamics will unfold (Ríos, 2024).
The candidates in the running were as follows: firstly, the DPP candidate You Si-kun, who was vying for re-election. Secondly, supported by the KMT was Han Kuo-yu, a former KMT 2020 presidential candidate known for his China-friendly stance. Lastly, the TPP nominated the lawmaker Huang Shan-shan for the position of speaker.
The election process unfolds as follows: initially, there is a round of voting where an absolute majority is necessary to elect the speaker. In the first round, Han from the KMT received 54 votes, You from the DPP received 51 votes, and Huang from the TPP received 8 votes. Since no candidate secured an absolute majority, a second round of voting was initiated only with the top two candidates from the initial round. The candidate for the KMT and DPP competed in a runoff vote, where a plurality of votes is sufficient for victory. Ultimately, Han emerged triumphant with 54 votes against You's 51. During this round, the TPP, which many consider a KMT ally, abstained. Han ultimately granted victory to the KMT with the support of the two independent legislators (Everington, 2024).
Overall, this year's elections leave us with a complex panorama in the legislative power, but it is an excellent opportunity for Taiwanese politics to strengthen interparty dialogues. In addition, with Han Kuo-yu as speaker, the most interested actors, such as China or the United States, are reassured that the DPP's most radical policies will be off the discussion table (Yang, 2024).
China's stance in the post-election panorama
Despite Beijing's interference in the electoral process with disinformation and air incursions (including a surveillance balloon), the most undesirable scenario has once again unfolded before the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) eyes with the DPP’s victory in the elections (Hioe, 2023). After acknowledging the results, China's Taiwan Affairs Office spokesperson, Chen Binhua, dismissed Lai's victory, claiming that it does not reflect Taiwanese citizens' sentiment and added that “the 1992 consensus is the common political foundation for cross-strait dialogue, and without it, any dialogue or interaction is impossible” (Chen, 2024). The statement suggests that the frozen cross-strait relationship will persist. However, attempting to delegitimise the DPP and coerce Taiwan could be a repeated mistake if China wishes to win over Taiwanese society for a peaceful reunification.
The long-lasting call from Beijing for Chinese nationalism and cultural heritage in Taiwan will continue. Nevertheless, the battle for Chinese identity in Taiwan appears to be a lost one. During the elections, identity takes a central position, but Taiwanese society is, generation by generation, becoming more disassociated from China. This is not only because many citizens feel no connection to their ancestors in mainland China, but also because embracing the concept of being Chinese, as promoted by the CCP, requires accepting its political system and the party’s ideology (Li, 2023). Such a definition does not resonate well in a society built upon the New Taiwanese Identity, a term coined by President Lee Teng-hui in 1986. The meaning of this concept is that it does not matter if one is an indigenous Taiwanese or a descendant of the Mainlanders who sought refuge in Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War; the island's nationality is rooted in the love for Taiwan and its democratic and humanitarian values, in contrast to China's stipulations.
From now until May 2024 (when the presidential transition is due to be formalised), it will be essential to monitor the actions of each side to ward off the risk of escalation. So far, the cutting of diplomatic ties by Nauru, the tenth diplomatic ally to abandon Taiwan since the DPP assumed the presidency in 2016, is the first blow from China in response to the election results, albeit indirect (Brennan, 2024). Nauru’s decision to switch its recognition back to China, as it did between 2002-2005, just 48 hours after the elections, undoubtedly stems from China's 'dollar diplomacy' in a microstate needing further economic income – particularly since Australia, Nauru’s major aid donor, plans to wind down support for the refugee processing centre over time (Needham & Lee, 2024). With fewer diplomatic allies, this action is a clear example of what was outlined in China’s August 2022 White Paper: 'Relying on external forces will achieve nothing for Taiwan's separatists, and using Taiwan to contain China is doomed to fail' (The State Council of The People’s Republic of China, 2022). Another example of China’s moves against Taiwan is its objection to the country’s hosting of an Asian international youth volleyball championship, which was then relocated from Taiwan to Indonesia on January 17 (Hart, 2024).
With the commencement of the new presidential and legislative term, significant changes in the Taiwan Strait seem unlikely. Potential hostilities and other 'grey zone' tactics will be contingent upon China's internal dynamics and reaction to the international environment. Consequently, it will be crucial to monitor key national factors that could overwhelm Beijing, including its economic crisis, rising youth unemployment rate, and substantial issues within the People's Liberation Army (Hart, 2024). Yet, as we approach the 2049 deadline outlined by Xi Jinping for completing China's modernisation and marking the end of a two-century cycle of decline, he underscores that the nation's modernisation remains incomplete without total reunification with Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan (Ríos, 2024).
Undoubtedly, the past, present, and future victories of the DPP persistently reopen a festering wound, and the concept of reunification continues to gain importance in China's political core. The CCP's peaceful application of the 'one country, two systems' framework is still considered the ideal resolution to the Taiwan question, but using force is viewed as a last resort under compelling circumstances (Tiezzi, 2022). It will be necessary to follow the new strategies proposed by Beijing to mobilise Taiwanese society again, considering that the dichotomy between “war or peace” does not seem to have reaped success in the island so far.
This article does not necessarily reflect the opinions of European Guanxi, its leadership, members, partners, or stakeholders, nor of those of its editors or staff. They have been formulated by the author in their full capacity, and shall not be used for any other purposes other than those they are intended for. European Guanxi assumes no liability or responsibility deriving from the improper use of the contents of this report. Any false facts, errors, and controversial opinions contained in the articles are proper and exclusive of the authors. European Guanxi or its staff and collaborators cannot be held responsible or legally liable for the use of any and all information contained in this document.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Ignacio Barroso recently graduated from Rey Juan Carlos University in Madrid, Spain, with a Bachelor’s in International Relations. Part of this academic training was conducted at the National Chengchi University and National Chengkung University, Taiwan (ROC), gaining valuable insight into East-Asian geopolitics and culture. His academic interests centre around the geopolitical and humanitarian field. His thesis has just been published in the academic magazine El Foco. Moreover, he is actively involved in international forums, such as the European Forum Alpbach and Asia Society Korea Youth.
Regarding his work experience, Ignacio was an intern at the EU-Japan Centre for Industrial Cooperation, and he currently works at the European Student Think Tank as a writer.
This article was edited by René Neumann and Alice Colantoni.
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