The Italian President of the Council of Ministers, Giorgia Meloni, had a cordial bilateral meeting with the President of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Xi Jinping, on the margins of the G20 Summit in Bali. Governo Italiano© https://www.governo.it/it/node/21017
The BRI and the Italian MoU
The rise of China on the global stage brought the country to unfold a series of winning projects. The 2013 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (YidaiYilu 一带一路) represents China’s most significant initiative to promote economic and cultural growth in both neighboring and sub-regions, stretching from Asia to Europe (Huang, 2016). First devised to reconfigure China’s external sector’s growth abroad, it focused on cultivating lasting ties with different countries. As declared by the Xi Jinping administration, the nature of the so-called New Silk Road supports cooperative mechanisms to reach mutual understandings and benefits among the partners.
But much of its narrative is nowadays polarized. On the one hand, a colonialist Chinese dialect is predominant. On the other hand, Chinese responses have been mainly on the defensive, trying to disassociate the Belt and Road Initiative from geopolitical or hegemonic ambitions. Instead, China argues that BRI projects help the local population and provide opportunities for shared development. However, neither of these disjointed narratives fully accounts for the complex and heterogeneous variety of the BRI projects. Nevertheless, sinologists more commonly support the BRI as a set of options for potential host countries (Tritto and Cambia, 2019).
Despite involving many partners globally, the BRI has recently returned to the European continent with new inputs. For instance, recent visits have been paid to many European countries, including Italy, on behalf of Chinese diplomacy. Rome signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Beijing in 2019, during the Giuseppe Conte government, making Italy the first G7 country to break ranks with its counterparts. Nineteen institutional and ten commercial agreements were signed four years ago at Villa Madama Palace on the red carpet that welcomed Chinese President Xi Jinping.
At the time, the announced package was to be worth 7 billion euros, spanning from commitments on the energy front (some Italian companies involved were Eni, Snam, and Ansaldo) to investments in ports (see the ports of Genoa and Trieste projects), telecommunications (with the 5G) and tourism. On paper, however, they have remained unapplied, abetted by diplomatic pressure from the United States (US), which has demanded the country turn around and loosen relations with its Asian rival.
Connectivity and Infrastructure Plans: An Overview
It comes as no surprise that when the Sino-Italian MoU came to life, concerns spread all across the West. The majority of the infrastructure investments agreements entailed partnerships between the Port of Genoa, under the Western Ligurian Sea Port Authority (WLSPA), and the Port of Trieste, under the Eastern Adriatic Sea Port Authority (EASPA), with the China Communications Construction Company (CCCC).
In practice, the ports of Genoa and Trieste both have long histories. The former is now under the WLSPA, which also includes Savona, Pra’, and Vado Ligure – and has operated in the Mediterranean since ancient times. The surrounding area was already an active shipping hub during Roman times. From then on, the Middle Ages paved the way for a crucial maritime stop at the center of the trading routes between Europe, Africa, and the East. Indeed, the Republic of Genoa controlled a network of commercial stations that stretched as far as the Black Sea and the Indian Ocean.
Similarly, Trieste’s commercial role started already in the 18th century. According to the President of the Port System Authority of the Eastern Adriatic Sea, Zeno D’Agostino, its foundation dates back to when the Emperor chose to elect it as the port of the Empire. This event triggered the implantation of the most varied and qualified economic enterprises. Among them, we may recall some of the largest insurance companies in Italian and European history, as well as the shipbuilding industry that is today the world leader in the cruise industry. The presence of the port has led to the start of specific activities such as coffee import-export and related industrial processing. Nowadays, the port of Trieste is undergoing a phase of extraordinary revitalization. In fact, it assumes a primary role at the national and international levels. Regarding the former, it is the first Italian port for traffic and rail movement. And in the international sphere, Trieste is the European reference hub for the Chinese New Silk Road, precisely a gateway to and from Europe and the Far East. Since the Port of Trieste opened in 1719, the modern and open trading system imagined three centuries ago is thus not an abstract tribute to the port of yesterday; rather, it is a reflection that also applies to the port of today and tomorrow and the other development strategies that will be implemented from its inspiration (Port of Trieste 300, 2023).
In contemporary times, the ports have been a driving force of the development of the Italian industry (Ghiretti, 2021). However, Italy’s perception of Chinese projects in its ports is that it will be long before they produce tangible results. On the tourism side, the pandemic might have slowed cultural interchange. However, there has been an increase in people-to-people exchanges between the two countries. Official Italian data show that in 2019 5.356 million Chinese tourists arrived in the Bel Paese, and Italy was one of the European countries with the highest number of Chinese tourist arrivals in that year.
Nowadays, after the full recovery of production and daily life, we are seeing noticeable growth in outbound tourism by Chinese citizens, with both inbound and outbound flows gradually increasing. For instance, in the week of the 2023 Chinese New Year, more than 2.83 million people alone had vacations. Recently, Italian tourism departments and many industry players have said that they look favorably at the return of Chinese tourists to Italy and are willing to try to provide them with high-quality services. “China is willing to work together with Italy to facilitate the resumption of bilateral people flows”, the newly Chinese Ambassador to Italy, Jia Guide, has reported in an interview with the Italian national press (ANSA, 2023).
Lastly, regarding the telecommunications aspect, many scholars and scientists say that new technologies are changing the geopolitical landscape. 5G, artificial intelligence, robotics, and nanotechnology are potent tools of influence in economic and business interests. 5G has especially attracted considerable attention in the country, given the China-based key players’ companies such as Huawei and ZTE. Indeed, telecoms have always been a thorny issue of the MoU. For years, a bipartisan front in American politics has demanded that European allies keep Chinese companies accused by the US of industrial espionage off the fifth-generation network. The risk is that Chinese vendors, under pressure from the central government, could pick up and use data running on the 5G network. In fact, all 4G infrastructure in Italy - on which 5G technology is to be developed - is in the hands of Chinese suppliers. In recent years, the Italian Giuseppe Conte, followed by the Mario Draghi governments, has opted for a middle-ground “Golden Power” strategy: that of strengthening the Palazzo Chigi to curb or modify an acquisition or investment. To do so, it extended its perimeter to the technology front. Moreover, the National Cybersecurity Agency was also inaugurated a year ago for this purpose. (Bechis, 2023)
The Contemporary Italian Stance with the New Meloni Leadership
More than 100 days after the newly elected Italian Premier Giorgia Meloni takes office, there is much uncertainty over the next course of relations between Italy and its largest Asian partner. Italy must decide what action to take with the Belt and Road Initiative MoU, which will automatically renew in 2024. Palazzo Chigi has less than ten months to decide whether to blatantly backtrack, renew the pacts quietly, or seek a likely compromise by renewing only some components of the deal.
In an attempt to meet the US objections, the past Conte government narrowed the topics covered by the agreement. Consequently, Draghi made it clear to Beijing that the relationship between the countries was a marginal aspect of its foreign policy. Both the Conte and Draghi governments made use of the Golden Power to prevent Chinese investment in Italy in semiconductors and “5G” telecommunications networks. Nevertheless, today, Washington’s objections are more assertive than ever because of China’s increased hi-tech competitiveness and global rivalry with Beijing.
It is up to the Meloni government to decide how to move. For Palazzo Chigi, this means being at a crossroads between a solid strategic understanding with the White House and the value of the Chinese market for Italian companies with an interchange that in 2020 exceeded 45 billion euros, including 16 billion Chinese investments in Italy.
The recent Chinese diplomatic visit to Italy has shaken up a hitherto silent and unspoken situation. PRC’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi came to Rome in mid-February to reiterate the importance of the renewal of the memorandum, as Xi clearly stated during November’s G20 Bali summit.
But what will Giorgia Meloni do? She seems conflicted in between China and the United States. Since Xi’s and Biden’s invitations to their countries almost overlap, Meloni is called upon to quickly decide whether to confirm or deny Conte’s choice on the privileged partnership with Beijing. Her choices vary, and she could pursue models that some other European countries have previously chosen, such as the Paris model of building stronger ties to China without “picking a side.” On the other hand, she could take a more firm approach as other Western capitols have done, since other G7 capitals have minor economic and commercial commitments with Beijing. However, Xi has made it clear that this would undermine and downgrade the state of their relations (La Repubblica, 2023).
What is clear now is that the word “Asia” frequently figures on the Italian government’s foreign policy desk. Hence, we will soon be spectators to a decision that could change Italy’s international position in a contested landscape between significant powers.
About the Author
Lucilla De Stefano holds a Double Master’s Degree in Chinese International Relations and Law from the China Foreign Affairs University of Beijing, and LUISS Guido Carli University of Rome. She visited China twice in her life, and lived in Beijing for a year. She is fond of the Belt and Road Initiative dynamics with Europe, which became the topic for her university dissertation. She is now working as an HR Analyst Junior Consultant at IFAD, a United Nations Specialized Agency. You can find her on LinkedIn.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s). They do not necessarily reflect the opinions or views of European Guanxi or its members.
Do you have an article you would like to share? Write for us.
Bibliography
ANSA. (2023). ‘Italia e Cina partner naturali, i fatti vincono sulla retorica’ - Mondo. [online] Available at: https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/mondo/2023/02/11/italia-e-cina-partner-naturali-i-fatti-vincono-sulla-retorica_85711042-4709-436c-bd62-69bd6d801edc.html [Accessed 21 Mar. 2023].
Bechis, F. (2023). Cina-Italia, dai porti al 5G fino agli aerei Atr: tutti i dossier (e i nodi) economici tra Roma e Pechino. [online] Available at: https://www.ilmattino.it/primopiano/politica/cina_italia_dossier_economia_5g_porti_via_seta-7239445.html?refresh_ce [Accessed 21 Mar. 2023].
Ghiretti, F. (2021). The Belt and Road Initiative in Italy: The Ports of Genoa and Trieste. [online] Available at: https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaip2117.pdf
Huang, Y. (2016). Understanding China’s Belt & Road Initiative: Motivation, Framework and Assessment. China Economic Review, [online], pp.314–321. Available at: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1043951X16300785
La Repubblica. (2023.). Meloni e il rebus cinese - la Repubblica.it. [online] Available at: https://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2023/02/26/meloni-e-il-rebus-cinese34.html?ref=search [Accessed 21 Mar. 2023].
Port of Trieste 300. (2023). 300 anni del Porto Franco di Trieste secondo il Presidente Zeno D’Agostino. [online] Available at: https://portoftrieste300.com/introduzione/ [Accessed 15 Mar. 2023].
Tritto, A & Camba, A. (2019). The Belt and Road: The Good, the Bad, and the Mixed. [online] Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/the-belt-and-road-the-good-the-bad-and-the-mixed/