Tracing the Evolution of China’s Domestic Space Sector: Institutions, Aims and Dynamics
- Franziska Kändler
- 4 days ago
- 10 min read
Introduction
From modest beginnings, China has emerged as the world’s second largest space power. The roots of China’s space programme date back to the 1950s. In 1956, Beijing listed space technology development as a national priority, including the goal in its 12th Long-term Programme for the Development of Science and Technology. This move coincided with the establishment of the PRC’s first space-related institutions. Following Russia’s launch of Sputnik, the world’s first artificial satellite, the Chinese government established its own space research and satellite programme. In 1970, China became the fifth country to successfully launch an artificial satellite using a domestic launch vehicle – the Dong Fang Hong I (东方红一号), which was carried into space on the Long March 1 (长征一号) rocket.
While initial progress remained slow due to limited resources and variable political support, this shifted from the late 1980s onwards. Buttressed by official commitments, China conducted rocket launches for international customers and grew its Earth Observation and communications capabilities. As of 2024, China was second in the world behind the United States in launches per year, government spending on space programmes, and satellites in orbit. China operates one of only four global coverage autonomous Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), and is now leading programmes spanning manned spaceflight, interplanetary exploration, and space science. China’s rapid rise and growing centrality has made understanding its domestic space policy system increasingly critical for external observers.
Institutional Context: Key Institutional Actors
China currently lacks a single comprehensive space law, though governing bodies have released a number of specific regulations on sub-sectors such as commercial launch. This comparative absence, in turn, highlights the importance of space policy in setting guiding principles for space activities in the country. China’s space activities are carried out within the broader framework stipulated by the Five-Year Plans. Specific guidance for the space sector during the respective period is set out by the State Council Information Office (SCIO): The first White Paper on China’s Space Activities was published in 2001, with its most recent iteration being the January 2022 publication ‘China's Space Program: A 2021 Perspective’. These White Papers provide the most comprehensive guidelines for space activities in China: They frame the broad development vision of China’s space programme, provide a summary of achievements during the previous Five-Year Plan, and specify key tasks and focus areas for the next period. They are supplemented by secondary policy outputs targeting more specific aspects of the space industry.
Given the dual-use nature of most space operations, legislative activity involves both civil government agencies and the military system. At the highest-level, space policy may emanate directly from the State Council or the Central Military Commission (CMC). Depending on the specific issue area at hand, several ministries and agencies may be involved in regulating space activities either individually or jointly. The most important civil administrative authority is the State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND), part of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT). SASTIND is responsible for developing and enforcing plans, policies, standards and rules pertaining to science, technology and industry for national defense. It also oversees the China National Space Administration (CNSA). For military space matters, the Central Military Commission’s Equipment Development Department (EDD) is the key institution, which may act jointly with civil bodies.
Turning to operational implementation, China’s space programmes are formally headed by different government agencies while State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) drive industrial capability development and manufacturing. In its current form, this division dates back to 1993, when the Ministry of Astronautics was dissolved and replaced by two entities: CNSA and the China Aerospace Corporation. In 1999, the latter was itself sub-divided into the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) and the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC).
Distinct agencies carry out the different segments of China’s space programme. The CNSA is China's national space agency, responsible for managing civilian space activities in lunar and planetary exploration and international space cooperation. Conversely, responsibility for manned spaceflight lies with the China Manned Space Agency (CMSA), which is situated under the EDD. The Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) is primarily involved in space science missions: it directly contributes to the manned and unmanned missions led by CNSA and CMSA and has been the pivotal actor in scientific cooperations with international space agencies. The three bodies thus act in close concert, notably releasing a joint national-level development programme for medium- to long-term space science in 2024.
China’s space programmes are supplied by CASC and CASIC, which dominate the country’s traditional space industry. CASC is the primary contractor for the CNSA and comprises several important subsidiaries. Among these are the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST), engaged in spacecraft design and manufacturing, and the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT), a launch vehicle manufacturer and service provider. Also of note is the China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC), a specialised company under CASC oriented towards commercialising China’s space industry internationally and providing launch services to the global market. CASIC, in turn, is primarily a defense contractor engaged in the development of missile defense and weapons systems for the PLA, with a more limited civilian business line.
National Policy Aims in the Space Sector
Termed the ‘space dream’ (航天梦 or 飞天梦), space sector development is part of China’s project of national rejuvenation and development. Space not only forms a core part of the 2015 Made in China 2025 industrial strategy to upgrade the manufacturing sector, but is governed by its own ambitious timeline: CASC officials outlined a roadmap for China to become a space superpower and global leader in space technology by 2045. The link between the space sector and national development is based on socioeconomic as much as geopolitical factors. Space is highly technology-intensive, thereby aligning with the official promotion of cutting-edge technology and R&D. Relevant initiatives offer significant economic opportunities on the international level. Moreover, space achievements may serve as a source of domestic and international prestige, signalling national progress and providing a lever for diplomatic engagement. Finally, space is increasingly security-relevant: Space assets underlie critical societal functions and are fundamental to crisis response, intelligence gathering and the effective conduct of modern warfare. This dimension makes potential deficits a matter of security relevance and has driven a push towards autonomous space capabilities within the PRC and beyond.
Collectively, recognition of the developmental and strategic significance of space has translated into heavy-handed high-level support, particularly in recent years. China’s space budget has grown significantly, both for governmental programmes and public investment into commercial space ventures. The core directives of development for 2021-2025 have been set out in the SCIO’s most recent White Paper “China's Space Program: A 2021 Perspective”. Beyond advancing the implementation of science missions and existing human spaceflight, lunar and planetary exploration programmes, the 2021 White Paper aims to strengthen the use of space-based solutions across terrestrial sectors and promote business development in the space sector. On the global stage, China seeks to deepen international cooperation in space missions and promote its vision of space governance. Space technology development, in turn, is a core aspect of the Made in China 2025 strategy. The MIC strategy identifies aviation and aerospace equipment as a strategic industry and defines specific ambitions for next-generation launch vehicles, national civilian space infrastructure and space-based applications, as well as manned spaceflight and space exploration projects.
China’s Space Programmes
Commonly known as Project 921 or the China Manned Space Programme, China’s human spaceflight programme was inaugurated in 1992. Following the launch of its first unmanned spacecraft in 1999, China became the third country after the USSR and the United States to successfully send an astronaut into space with the October 2003 Shenzhou 5 (神舟五号) mission. As of November 2022, China maintains an autonomous and permanently crewed space station, the Tiangong space station (TSS) (天宫空间站), which forms the third and final step of China’s Manned Space Programme. With the International Space Station (ISS) due to be deorbited by the end of 2030, Tiangong may become the only operational sovereign station in the coming decade.
China’s lunar exploration programme was announced in February 2003 and launched in January 2004. Known as the Chang’e Project (嫦娥工程), it has consisted of a series of robotic uncrewed lunar probes. In October 2007, the Project reached its first milestone when the CNSA launched the Change-1 probe to orbit and image the lunar surface. A first successful landing was achieved with Chang’e-3, marking the second phase of the lunar programme and the first moon landing since 1976. The 2019 Chang’e-4 and 2024 Chang’e-6 missions then became the first spacecraft to land on and retrieve samples from the far-side of the moon. Outside of the Chang’e programme, manned lunar exploration has been enshrined as a core focus of the CMSA in recent years. CMSA currently plans to land two astronauts on the moon before 2030 and has reported steady progress on this timeline.
Like the United States, the CNSA conducts an interplanetary spaceflight programme. Known as the Planetary Exploration of China or Tianwen (天问) programme, initial planning began in 2016. In July 2020, the Tianwen-1 mission was launched. The robotic spacecraft successfully reached Mars’ orbit and deployed the Zhurong rover to the planet’s surface in the following year. In doing so, China became the third country after the U.S. and the USSR to successfully land and the second after the U.S. to operate a spacecraft on Mars. Tianwen-2 and Tianwen-3 target a near-earth astronaut and a sample return mission to Mars, while Tianwen-4 is planned to set its sights on the Jupiter system.
China has invested considerable effort into the development of autonomous space infrastructure, capabilities, and space-based applications. Especially notable is the BeiDou system (北斗卫星导航系统), an autonomous Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) first proposed in 1997. The system became operational in 2000, offering services to the Chinese mainland before expanding second generation coverage to the Asia-Pacific in 2012. The third generation BeiDou-3 system has provided global coverage since 2018 and reached full operational capacity in 2020. BeiDou-3’s navigation services have been a core part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative: For one, Beijing has offered prioritised, free-of-charge access to Beidou data and services to BRI member nations. Additionally, BeiDou is integrated into a large share of the Chinese-made digital infrastructure exported as part of the Digital or Information Silk Road.
Commercialisation
China’s aerospace industry has traditionally been dominated by state actors and SOEs, excluding private participation. This situation changed in 2014, when selected space industry sectors were gradually opened to private financing. Since then, China has witnessed the rapid growth of a commercial space industry. At the same time, it is important to note that this burgeoning commercial sector remains intimately linked to SOEs, public support and funding, and national objectives. The line between public and private enterprises can be fluid: Many commercial companies are subsidiaries of SOEs or emerged as spin-offs of CAS institutes, with state- or mixed-ownership models. Funding for commercial space enterprises comes not just from private investment, but also from SOEs or central and provincial governments. Such backing has increased over time, as policies have recognised the commercial sector as a strategic industry and a new growth engine. Several municipal and provincial plans have sought to follow up on these national objectives: Beijing and Shanghai, centres of China’s traditional space sector, each host clusters of large commercial space companies. Since 2023, both municipal administrations have published designated action plans to foster the local commercial space ecosystem through funding, supportive policies and dedicated research and production hubs. Similar clusters and policies have emerged nation-wide, from Wuhan to the rapidly expanding commercial spaceport in Hainan.
Though China’s commercial space industry continues to lag behind the revenues and technological achievements of its U.S. counterpart, the aforementioned efforts have seen it rapidly progress. China has successfully produced a number of highly innovative space enterprises. In the launch vehicle sector, companies such as Landspace, Space Pioneer, Galactic Energy and iSpace are working to develop reusable vehicles for rapid and affordable access to space. Private companies are also increasingly active across other segments of the space economy, incorporating satellite communications technology into electric vehicles and launching mega-constellations. Led by Shanghai Spacecom Satellite Technology with municipal government backing, the Qianfan (“Thousand Sails”, G60 Starlink) constellation aims to compete with SpaceX’s Starlink in providing global broadband internet services by 2030.
Beyond the potential profitability of space business activities, Chinese government support for the commercial space industry links to national policy objectives. In order to secure the frequency allocations attributed to its planned government satellite constellations by the International Telecommunications Union, China has to rapidly scale up its deployment of new satellites in the coming years. This requires higher launch rates, for which the country intends to partially draw upon commercial capabilities. On the international stage, public and private entities alike are engaged in infrastructure projects of what has been termed China’s Space Silk Road. Finally, the technological innovations of commercial companies may be available for military use through cooperation with the PLA and its research institutes, as part of China’s Military-Civil Fusion strategy in the space sector.
Conclusion
From its beginnings in the 1950s, China’s space sector has grown to – by many metrics – outpace that of European spacefaring nations and rival the U.S. In its evolution, it has been deeply interlinked with the broader policy lines characterising the PRC system: China’s Space Dream has become a reflection of national prestige, a strategic sector of advanced technology development and, increasingly, a source of economic opportunity. With the growing strategic relevance of space, autonomous access to space capabilities has also become a core element of the PRC’s national security posture. While China’s growing commercial sector has gradually broken the duopoly of its SOEs in the aerospace industry, it remains intimately linked with public actors and national aims in what has been termed ‘Commercialisation with Chinese Characteristics’. Looking forward, China’s space activities are likely to intensify further in line with official objectives and business incentives, in turn increasingly positioning China as a space power on the international stage.
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Franziska Kändler is a graduate of Sciences Po Paris, specialising in digital and technology policy with a particular focus on EU-China and U.S.-China relations. She has worked at the European Space Policy Institute and the Prague Security Studies Institute, and is the U.S.-China Analyst of the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research.
This article was edited by Susanna Aghajanyan and Daria Bogolyubova.
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