EU–China relations in the aftermath of the Hungarian parliamentary elections 2026

On April 12, 2026, people in Hungary voted for their future in the parliamentary elections. After sixteen years holding a two-third parliamentary majority, Fidesz lost that same threshold to the opposition Tisza Party, which was a result few had anticipated. With the victory of Tisza, a new political path has opened for the country, as the most pressing constitutional matters can only be amended with a two-thirds majority. As such, many significant changes are expected in Hungary following these election results, especially in the public sphere. However, questions remain about the private sphere, particularly regarding Chinese investors operating in the country. So far, the only indication of potential reforms comes from Tisza’s political programme, but these proposals are inherently limited by domestic law, existing contractual obligations, and international commitments. Though one could expect changes in both China–Hungary and EU–China relations, the changes must remain within these legal and institutional limits.

Sino–Hungarian relations: past, present and future

In 2029, China and Hungary will celebrate the 80th anniversary of their diplomatic relations. Hungary was among the first countries to recognise the newly founded People’s Republic of China in 1949, but the relationship has not always been easy, especially during the Cold War and the transitional period of the post-Soviet area. It is only from the 1990s and early 2000s, that they have started to develop closer ties, with Hungary’s foreign policy being aligned with that of the EU after joining the organisation in 2004, and therefore opening up more internationally.

Since the early years of power, Fidesz has promoted closer cooperation with Asian countries under the ‘Opening to the East’ policy. For example, since 2010, the political relations have been characterised by regular high-level meetings and reinforced by cultural and economic cooperation contracts, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2015. However, due to a lack of transparency, there is little known about the specific agreements signed during these meetings. This lack of transparency is particularly concerning in the context of bilateral economic relations given the power imbalance between the two countries. While major bilateral agreements – such as the 1991 Bilateral Investment Agreement or the BRI – are publicly accessible, many smaller-scale agreements remain confidential. Notably, eighteen contracts signed in May 2024 have not been disclosed, despite the rulings by the Metropolitan Regional Court.

Economic cooperation with China – particularly in the critical minerals and electric vehicle sector – is supported not only by Hungarian actors but by both other Central and Eastern European countries and Western stakeholders, notably German automakers. However, when it comes to EU foreign policy, long-term security concerns continue to divide Member States. The disagreement stems from the modalities of cooperation, rather than the partnership in itself.

In practice, while many Member States push for a more levelled playing field to safeguard long-term strategic interests, Hungary has often prioritised short-term economic gains. This issue is further exacerbated by the lack of coordination between EU Member States: in the absence of negotiation between political representatives, market forces will prevail. For example, when tenders are issued for a Chinese battery factory in Europe, Member States compete to win the project. If a country like Hungary offers more favourable conditions – such as less restrictive environmental protection constraints – its offer will prevail over more environmentally-conservative states.

While the winning country might take home a lot of tenders and benefit economically in the short-term, it carries long-term costs for itself and the EU as a whole, such as environmental degradation and increased economic dependency. Alternatively, EU Member States could negotiate minimum regulatory standards and leverage their collective position to secure better deals with Chinese companies, such as joint ventures or broader technological collaboration. However, this strategy remains fragile: as long as even a single Member State opts out of inter-EU cooperation, the collective approach collapses. In this regard, the position of the previous Hungarian government has not helped.  

What can we learn from Tisza’s programme plan about the Asian region?

Both European and Chinese actors are watching closely to see how Tisza’s approach will shape China–Hungary and EU–China relations. Formality and politeness in diplomatic relations have always been important to China. In line with this, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs congratulated Tisza for their victory and reaffirmed its respect for China–Hungarian bilateral relationships – past, present and future. So far, Beijing seems calm about the regime change in Hungary, given the clear power imbalance between the two countries. Nonetheless, one might expect changes in the broader context of EU–China relations, to the extent that a more cooperative Hungary can play a role in creating a unified China policy. 

According to Tisza’s programme, the new Party will strive to ‘open up to the world, in accordance with the federal system.’ In other words, they promise to cooperate with all global partners within the limits of international law. At the same time, the party emphasises that ‘national interests must never be subordinated to the business interests of individuals.’

However, its strategy towards the Asian region remains vague, and a clear China policy seems to be intentionally left out. What is clear now, however, is an ambition to reshape Hungary’s approach to Asia’s leading economies through a strategy that would simultaneously serve the country’s security, economic development, and alliance commitments. The party’s approach to the electric vehicle sector is particularly relevant, as this is where most Chinese investments are concentrated. In this regard, Tisza proposes to ‘establish an independent body to continuously monitor heavily polluting industries and activities.’

Sino–European relations in the aftermath of the Hungarian elections

What do all of these changes mean in practice? Although Tisza is likely to pursue a more balanced approach – one that is in line with international obligations – its room for manoeuvre will be limited by existing contracts with Chinese partners, such as real estate and property contracts. Revising contracts between private actors is difficult enough, but when it comes to concession agreements, it is even harder. For example, sudden changes to environmental regulations or the revision of previously issued licences could carry a high risk of triggering domestic litigation and arbitration proceedings.

Chinese investors are not only protected under private contracts, but can also invoke the China–Hungary Bilateral Investment Treaty, which provides them with an additional layer of legal protection. Shanghai and Hong Kong are emerging as important international arbitration centres, and Chinese actors are increasingly familiar with the protections available under such treaties. Tisza will therefore need to proceed cautiously when modifying regulations, ensuring that any changes remain consistent with the state’s obligations under both private contracts and bilateral agreements. 

In reality, a new parliamentary majority cannot deliver structural changes overnight. However, if they proceed slowly and carefully, they could align Hungarian regulations – particularly in areas such as investment screening and environmental licensing – with EU requirements, not only in its formalities, but also in practice. With that being said, existing agreements cannot simply be undone; a meaningful shift in Sino–European relations requires a collective and sustained effort from all EU Member States. In this context, the new Hungarian parliamentary majority may make that collective effort somewhat easier to achieve.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author(s) alone and do not necessarily reflect those of European Guanxi.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Zselyke Lévai is currently pursuing a Master of International Economic Law at Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne University. She has a strong focus on Chinese foreign direct investment screening and promotion, as well as on trade barriers affecting Chinese firms in Europe. She previously graduated from The Hague University of Applied Sciences with a BA in European Studies, having spent her second year on an Erasmus+ exchange at Sciences Po Lille. During her undergraduate studies, she interned at the Embassy of Hungary in Paris and joined as a volunteer and blog writer to the European Union's cultural and information centre in Budapest. She is fluent in English, French, and Hungarian and has been studying Mandarin for three years.

This article was edited by Daria Bogolyubova and Nina Thinnes.

Featured Image: Hungarian Parliament Building / Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 2.0 Generic license / Free for use