At the start of 2024, Taiwan drew attention following the victory of the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP) in the presidential election of January 13, 2024, led by its former Vice President, Lai Ching-te (Hart et al, 2024). On the other side of the strait, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has insisted on the inevitability of reunification between the two territories. Following the 1992 consensus, both Taiwan and China recognised the existence of a single China, but this notion is open to interpretation (Shiquan, 2001). Beijing has defended that the island is an integral part of China, comparable to one of its provinces. China declares itself to be a unitary state, although Taiwan, formally the Republic of China, is de facto independent.
This situation prompts exploration of the notion of unitary state in the Chinese political system. A unitary state is generally defined as a state where the central government plays a major role. This central government often has supremacy, guaranteed by the concentration of power at national level, and the law applies to all citizens. This idea was already presented in the 1982 Chinese Constitution (National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China, 2004).
This article will focus on certain clauses of the preamble to the Chinese Constitution, which is particularly evocative of Beijing's policy of unity: "The People's Republic of China is a unitary multinational State created jointly by the people of all its nationalities. Socialist relations of equality, unity and mutual assistance have been established among the nationalities and will continue to be strengthened. In the struggle to safeguard the unity of the nationalities, it is necessary to combat big-nation chauvinism, mainly Han chauvinism, and to combat local national chauvinism. The State will do its utmost to promote the common prosperity of all the nationalities." (National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, 2004)
The focus of this analysis will be directed towards this section of the preamble, aimed at assessing the unity policy and establishing the accuracy of categorising China as a unitary multinational state. Thus, the elements that characterise the Chinese unitary state will be examined, followed by the obstacles that stand in the way of this conception.
It will be demonstrated that although China defines itself as a unitary state by insisting on equality within the Nation and a common creation, in reality, these principles are limited and must be nuanced.
In China, an aspiration of unity
First of all, the Montevideo Convention of 1933 highlights four components to define a state : sovereignty, territory, government, and people (International Law Students Association). The latter criterion needs close scrutiny. In the preamble, it is stated that the state is "created jointly by the people of all its nationalities." In this context, the concept of nationality refers to ethnicity rather than citizenship or link with the state, which, in turn, means a group of individuals that share common socio-cultural values such as language or history. Such confusion between the terms resulted from mistranslation of the Chinese constitutions. Particularly, "shǎoshù mínzú" – an expression meaning "small number" and "clan" – has usually been translated as "nationalities" to English, being instead closer to "ethnicity" (UBC School of Public Policy and Global Affairs, 2018). China thus puts forward the idea that the state is multinational, the result of a joint creation of various ethnic groups. However, in reality, there are 56 ethnic groups making up the Chinese nation, including the Manchus, the Tibetans and even the Uighurs. However, it is important to contextualise this diversity, given that the Han ("hàn zú") constitute the vast majority, comprising nearly 92% of the Chinese population, totaling over 1.2 billion individuals (University of Minnesota, 2009).
Despite this obvious superiority, China emphasises the equality of the diverse ethnic groups, saying that "... socialist relations of equality, unity and mutual assistance have been established among the nationalities." These socialist relations refer to a state policy based on the ideology of Marxism-Leninism which is enshrined in the Constitution but it has to be distinguished from the thought of Mao Zedong and Xi Jinping, also enshrined in this Constitution (Buckley, 2017). Therefore, socialist policy aims to preserve national unity in China, a symbol of strength for centuries. As Chinese rhetoric goes, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) must be central, and socialism must achieve social equality, reduce economic inequality and promote a harmonious society. This way, national cohesion could be consolidated by promoting balanced development between the country's different regions.
For example, the re-approval of Confucianism, banned under Mao Zedong as "counter-revolutionary," is not intended to satisfy family customs, but to consolidate national cohesion and give the image of a China united by its ancient culture (Gregor and Chang, 1979). The existence of a single constitution for the whole country, despite the strong differences between regions and ethnic groups, also serves to reinforce this unity within the country, and it is also on this basis of unity among the Chinese that China wants to regain control of Taiwan, considered as one of its provinces. Xi Jinping has already announced that he will not hesitate to use force if necessary (Tian & Blanchard, 2022).
The People's Republic of China is therefore a multinational state with a strong emphasis on unity, but for China, preserving it also means combating certain ideas. The preamble states that "...in the struggle to safeguard the unity of the nationalities, it is necessary to combat big-nation chauvinism, mainly Han chauvinism." The Cambridge Dictionary (2024) describes chauvinism as "the strong and unreasonable belief that your own country or race is the best or most important." . Clearly, in the case of China, it refers to the desire to privilege one's own ethnic group and elevate it to the status of an example. Han chauvinism implies the exaggerated patriotism of the Hans, the historical Chinese people who tended to claim cultural superiority.
Due to this, China perceives it as a danger to undermining its national unity. Certainly, any form of differential treatment based on ethnicity, whether it be discrimination or segregation, would contradict China's Constitution and could lead to internal political rifts.. But in addition to this Han chauvinism, the preamble mentions the idea of more local nationalism. This "local national chauvinism" is not explained further. Although it seems to be closer to chauvinism, it could be a way of indirectly designating independence or local autonomy. Demands for greater autonomy or even full sovereignty could upset Beijing's policy of unity, since it would weaken or damage the image of a unitary state. Like Han chauvinism, it is perceived as a danger to China.
In China, a facade of unity
So far it has already been discussed that China, in theory, defines itself as a unitary state and seeks to promote unity, particularly between ethnic groups, within its borders. To this end, it does not hesitate to combat ideas deemed deviant. In practice, however, this vision of Chinese unity, and in particular its principles, is subjective. For example, the end of the extract from the preamble refers to a desire to initiate a process "to promote the common prosperity of all the nationalities." It implies the common development of all the ethnic groups that make up the idea of unity. However, this preamble was created during the era of Deng Xiaoping. After the death of Mao Zedong, Deng launched major reforms to modernise the country and liberalise the economy. Among the most important reforms were the end of collectivisation, reforms for banks and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and the creation of special economic zones (SEZs), such as Shanghai's Pudong, to attract foreign capital (Keo, 2020). These reforms led to China's emergence, with GDP growth sometimes in double digits (The World Bank, 2024).
However, this new prosperity proved to be disparate, as it mainly characterised nationalities and regions located close to the coastal provinces, rather than those far from the coast. By way of example, the average income gap between the Han and other ethnic groups has almost doubled in ten years, and inland China is now known to be poorer than the coastal areas (Yang et al., 2017). This demonstrates an initial limitation to the unity between ethnic groups sought by Beijing, as certain ethnic groups, such as the Tibetans, live in a much less developed region. Similarly, China defends its "socialist relations of equality, unity and mutual assistance" between ethnic groups. Yet, despite these claims, China has policies of assimilation and repression towards certain minority nationalities. For example, many states and NGOs around the world accuse China of imprisoning Uighurs and forcing them to work, in particular to harvest cotton (Maizland, 2022 ii). There is therefore a real paradox between Chinese constitutional norms and the actions of the Chinese Communist Party.
In reality, these limits to Chinese policy are also due to a criticised assent to the notion of unity. China puts forward the idea of joint creation in the preamble to its Constitution, which claims to be voluntary on the part of all ethnic groups. Of course, this is open to criticism, as this joint creation has not always been voluntary. The case of Tibet bears witness to this. The Tibetan community has involuntarily undergone a process of Sinicisation since the Chinese annexation of the region in the 1950s. This Sinicisation of Tibet is reflected in the transformation of Tibetan society in this autonomous region on the basis of Chinese norms, whether through cultural assimilation, migration, reform policies or even the adoption of a market economy (U.S. Department of State, 2022). The notion of cultural assimilation demonstrates that China, instead of promoting its diversity through its minorities, is attempting to downgrade regional and minority languages, such as Tibetan, in favor of Mandarin, the national language spoken by the Han majority.
At this point, it seems clear that the preamble to the Chinese Constitution, which was motivated by the notions of unity, solidarity, and mutual aid, now seems questionable. It appears that the authoritarian trends of the CCP are, in fact, themselves a limit to the policy of Chinese unity, as this seeks to maintain the idea of a unitary Chinese state in a state that does not naturally want to be unitary, at least in some regions. A recent example of this is the protests in Hong Kong in 2019 and 2020. This territory was marked by numerous demonstrations as the inhabitants refused to be homogenised with the rest of China and wanted to retain the principle of “one country, two systems” protecting their democracy (Maizland, 2022, i). This clearly shows that the notion of unity advocated by China is not necessarily shared by all. The terms "unity," "solidarity," and "mutual aid" are therefore not absolute and do not fully exist at a national level.
To conclude, China gives centrality to its policy of national unity, which is based on the idea of full equality within the nation, and the common creation of the nation through the voluntary participation of all ethnic groups. To achieve this unity, China has to combat certain ideas such as chauvinism and local nationalism. In reality, however, these principles have proved to be quite flexible, and in this respect, the promised utopia is not a reality. China is pressing for acceptance of its concept of national unity with regard to the island of Taiwan, but the reality portrays an incongruent idea of unity on the Chinese mainland which privileges the Han identity and coastal regions. Despite China's assertions, the implementation of this idea seems to be encountering obstacles. The cultural and political diversity of mainland China reflects a complexity that eludes perfect unification. Taiwan, for its part, resists attempts at assimilation, preserving a distinct identity. In view of these factors, China's assertions appear to be empty rhetoric, disconnected from the real complexity of the situation.
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Nicolas Dumoulin is a sophomore at Sciences Po Grenoble in France. He is passionate about international affairs, especially those related to China. He is currently pursuing an exchange programme in the United States at the George Washington University.
This article was edited by René Neumann, Juan García-Nieto and Sardor Allayarov.
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