A Sinopec plant in Nanjing, China. Sinopec is the world’s largest oil refining, gas and petrochemical conglomerate. Credit: CFOTO/Future Publishing, via Getty Images ©
This month marks the one-year anniversary of what was originally supposed to be a “10 day” Russian land invasion of Ukraine. The Russian export of oil and gas generates an indispensable revenue that allows the state to fuel its military efforts in the war. The People’s Republic of China (hereafter China) is one of the main importers of Russian hydrocarbons. Against this backdrop, this article assesses the role of China in the conflict from a politics of energy perspective. More specifically, it provides an analytical toolbox to ponder an answer to the following question: Is China supporting the Russian Federation in the war against Ukraine by buying its fossil fuels?
A first section takes a historical perspective on the matter. By comparing the current energy turmoil with the energy crisis in 1973, this article exposes the recently acquired bargaining power of the Newly Industrialized countries. The second section describes the Chinese engagement in the conflict from different perspectives through diverse theoretical lenses and standpoints. As Mark Twain put it, history never repeats itself, but it does often rhyme. The current “energy stanza” has similarities with the first major global energy shock in 1973. There are also significant differences that offer an insight in understanding the position that China occupies in relation to the war in Ukraine.
Energy Crises and Global Politics
In the context of the Cold War, and for the first time in history, energy became a major theme in global politics due to the Yom Kippur War. This war was an armed conflict that involved Israel (supported by the United States of America, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands) and Egypt (backed by a coalition of Arab states) that caused the 1973 oil shock. Leveraging the control over the production and distribution of energy for political purposes, the Arab oil-producing nations belonging to the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries proclaimed an oil embargo by targeting the states that were supporting their rival in the military confrontation. This use of energy with the intention of influencing the result of conflict (i.e., weaponization of energy) marked an unprecedented act of retaliation that drastically reduced overnight the oil input of many industrialized nations and thereby created a global economic recession.
Similarly, in 2022, because of the Russian invasion of Ukraine the global energy landscape has been radically reshaped. This war came at a time when the energy market had high volatility and was imbalanced due to the rapid drop in demand caused by the Covid-19 pandemic and the subsequent global supply chain disturbances. Energy restrictions directly affected the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the states that supported the latter. However, the global energy consumption today sharply contrasts with that of 50 years ago. A comparison between High-Income countries and Low- and Middle-Income countries (LMIC) illustrates the point (see Figure 1). In 1973, the energy consumption of High-Income countries represented approximately 73%. Conversely, in 2022, the “lion’s share” of energy spending comes from the LMIC with a 65%. The newly industrialized countries with China and India at the front, lead the increase of the LMIC.
Source: Author’s elaboration based on data from BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2022 | 71th edition. To adhere to the used database taxonomy, High-Income countries are imprecisely located in North America and Europe while LMIC are situated in Asia Pacific region, Latin America, Middle East, and the African continent. Not all countries in these regions are LMIC (e.g., Japan, South Korea, and Australia). However, the figures give an approximate idea of the energy consumption pattern shift.
This entirely different distribution of energy consumption patterns affects the politics of energy in two main ways. Firstly, in detriment of the High-Income importing states’ political leverage on energy, the LMIC energy importing countries enjoy of a newly acquired bargaining power. Secondly the energy exporting states see their trading options diversified and therefore a new constellation of dependencies emerges. Back in 1973, the Arab states involved in the conflict were highly dependent on the revenues from energy export to high-income countries. During the embargo, these nations did not find alternative buyers for their oil, and therefore had a strong incentive to finish the conflict. Peace was signed less than a month after the war began, and the oil trade resumed shortly after. In 2022 Russia’s energy companies can diversify their exports in a way it would not have been possible in 1973. That is because the LMIC, which tends to have a rather equidistant stand on the conflict, have a higher energy demand. This structural difference is one of the factors that explain why this war can be prolonged.
Between 1973 and 2022, three main developments have reshuffled the traditional understanding of the politics of energy. The first two, the energy transition and the so-called “Shell Revolution” play against Moscow’s interest. The third one, as detailed above, resides in the new global energy consumption needs. The latter can benefit the Kremlin. For example, since the beginning of the war, Russian exports of coal to China have grown (Reuters 2022). Moreover, Russian companies’ oil sells have increased to China and have skyrocketed to India (Financial Times 2022). As regards Russian gas, the following headlines exemplify the power implications of the current global energy consumption geographies: “Moscow says power of Siberia 2 pipeline to China will “replace” North Stream 2” (Euronews 2022). Due to the revenue generated by their purchase of fossil fuels, the two Asian countries, among others, have become Russia’s economic lifeline during the current war. The higher the energy consumption of LMIC is, the less bargaining power the high-income energy-importing countries have.
Which Theory? Whose Standpoint?
The consequences of the war in Ukraine demonstrate that in the 21st century energy still lies at the heart of international relations. The way in which energy and politics are intertwined depends on the theoretical lens of choice. This section discusses how the main International Relations theories, namely Classical Realism, Neorealism, Liberalism, and Constructivism go about the issue at stake, and how different states may choose one theoretical angle or another to defend their strategic interests.
From a Classical Realist point of view, China would not be supporting the Kremlin in the war by purchasing its fossil fuels. To conclude that, this theory stresses the military and diplomatic dimensions. In contrast with Iran’s and Belarusian’s governments, China has not increased Russia’s military capabilities by enhancing its technological or positional power. As regards the diplomatic dimension, the following quote by the Ukrainian President steams a Classical Realist flair: "China has chosen the policy of staying away. At the moment, Ukraine is satisfied with this policy. It is better than helping the Russian Federation in any case. And I want to believe that China will not pursue another policy. We are satisfied with this status quo, to be honest." (Zelenskyy 25-05-2022). A Classical Realist view considers energy trade as part of the state’s diplomacy and not as explicit military support.
Conversely, from a Neo-realist angle, China’s energy purchases can be seen as supporting the Russian government in its war efforts. This approach puts emphasis on the international system and acknowledges the direct political function of energy. From this standpoint, in a context where Russia’s economy is weakened by international sanctions, China’s ramping its energy import up provides systemic support to the Eurasian country. By following the same logic, India and other states that maintain or even increase the energy trade would equally be aiding the invading army. An example of this could be the European governments’ stands on the energy trade with Russia since the beginning of the 2022 Russian invasion to Ukraine, which are infused with Neo-realist premises.
From the viewpoint of Liberalism (especially Commercial Liberalism), it could be argued that China is not supporting the Kremlin in the conflict. Liberalism unfolds under the principle that the higher the interconnection between two states is the lower the likelihood of a conflict will be. This logic plays upon the basis that in a highly interdependent context the costs of a war are outgrown by the benefits of peace. From this angle, by increasing its energy trade with the Russian Federation, China would not only not be supporting it, but it would also be preventing a further escalation of the conflict by deterring Moscow from crossing a redline that Beijing has drawn: the usage of nuclear weapons in the war (Politico 2022). From the Zhongnanhai’s standpoint, their energy trade with Russia could be position under the conceptual umbrella of Liberalism.
On the other hand, a Constructivist take on the politics of energy emphasises the importance of shared worldview configurations. Thus, whether China supports Russia by purchasing its fossil fuels depends on each state’s interpretation. Constructivism claims that objective events do not exist per se. What matters is how a given phenomenon is perceived. Analysing intersubjective arrangements, this approach determines power relations by looking at unites of meaning (e.g., texts, images, speeches). The main proponents of this perspective to analyse this war (e.g., USA) define China’s position as pro-Russian. To sustain these claims the attention is based on facts such as Beijing buying into the Orwellian euphemism promoted by the Kremlin that defines the ongoing war as a “special military operation”. Similarly, Xi’s and Putin’s announcement of a “friendship without limits” in February 2022, the very same month when the attack began, has also become the object of the advocators of this theoretical understanding. Another layer of meaning attribution for the Sino-Russian energy trade is embedded in a growing new Cold War narrative. The mainstream USA interpretation on the Chinese purchase of Russian fossil fuels (e.g., CNN 2023) wields a constructivist logic that places the East Asian country as siding with Moscow in the energy sector and beyond.
In a nutshell, the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine opens a new chapter of the global politics of energy. This article has stressed that the Low and Middle-Income countries, with the Newly Industrialized states at the forehead, have seen their political leverage increased due to larger energy consumption share. With that, Russian options to diversify its energy exports have also increased. Furthermore, the article has emphasized how states’ arguments and actions take place, explicitly or tacitly, within a certain theoretical context. The discussion on the appropriateness and shortcomings of each of the used frames of interpretation (i.e., theories) allows for a more nuanced and fruitful discussion on the politics of the Sino-Russian energy trade.
About the Author
Miquel Salvadó-Gracia is a Ph.D. candidate in the Alliance for Research of East Asia (AREA) Ruhr, in Germany. He obtained his M.A. in International Relations from Shandong University and his B.A. in Philosophy from the University of Barcelona. He is also the Vice-President of European Guanxi.
The opinions expressed here are those of the writers and do not represent the views of European Guanxi.
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References
- BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2022 | 71st edition Available at: https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf
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- Zelenskyy (25-05-2022). Davos Ukrainian Breakfast Discussion. Video hosted by the Victor Pinchuk Foundation Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jNpdGQGtTc0&ab_channel=VictorPinchukFoundation