Following the outbreak of Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7th 2023, China joined the international community in calling for the immediate de-escalation of the situation and the pursuit of a two-state solution (Hale, 2023). However, a week after the attack, Beijing deviated from its usual political platitudes and instead, proceeded to criticise Israel's bombardment of Gaza, all while remaining tight-lipped on Hamas’s initial attacks. As opposed to adhering to its long standing posture of diplomatic neutrality and non-interference, the Chinese foreign ministry stated that “Israel’s actions went beyond the scope of self-defence” and demanded that it stopped its “collective punishment on the people of Gaza” (Wang, 2023). Similarly, in recent months, Beijing has proceeded to double down on its criticisms of Israel. For instance, in the BRICS summit held in 2023, Xi stated that the root cause of the situation today can largely be attributed to the indifference towards “the Palestinian people’s right to statehood, existence and their right of return” (Xinhua, 2023).
Furthermore, in the China-Middle East Summit held in November 2023, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi stated that China has “always firmly supported” the Palestinian cause and the “restoration of their legitimate national rights and interests” (Tian and Chen, 2023). He also alluded to Israel’s ongoing unilateral attacks on the Palestinian enclave by stating that there was a humanitarian disaster unfolding in Gaza (Tian and Chen, 2023).
While Beijing has historically defended the statehood of both Israel and Palestine, all in accordance to its doctrine of non-interference and diplomatic impartiality, its current foreign policy orientation towards the conflict largely demonstrates a pro-Palestinian tilt. The latter has been demonstrated through Beijing’s unequivocal sympathy towards Palestine, which largely diverges from its approach of consistently amping up the verbal ante towards Israel.
Similarly, China’s support for Palestine is not a novel approach, but one that can be traced all the way back to Mao’s China (1949-1976). For example, in the 1960’s, Beijing not only vocalised its support for the Palestine Liberation Movement, but also proceeded to provide weapons to its soldiers (Ahsan, 2023). Furthermore, it regarded both Israel and Taiwan as being the two bases of Western imperialism in Asia (Çalışkan 2023). Beijing has also historically voted against Israel within multilateral forums as not only voted for the UN resolution condemning Israel’s 2010 raid on the Gaza flotilla, but also voted for the commission formed by the UN to investigate war crimes in the aftermath of the 2014 Gaza conflict (Singh, 2023). However, it is important to note that rather than helming these initiatives, Beijing has preferred to blend in with the international crowd and assert their voice through the flurry of various UN security resolutions.
Nonetheless, while China has historically maintained its political camaraderie towards the Palestinians, it has simultaneously adopted a diplomatically versatile and flexible approach towards Israel. One where bilateral ties have largely been characterised by “cold politics and hot economics 政冷经热” (Peng, 2023). While maintaining its criticisms of Israel within the geopolitical front, Tel Aviv has become a major node within China’s economic Belt and Road Initiative (Efron et al., 2020, p.17) For example between 2007 to 2020, China invested about $19 billion in Israel with $9 billion earmarked for technological investments and $6 billion for infrastructure projects (Amer, 2021). The latter includes the Haifa Bayport Terminal, acquired in 2021 and currently operated by the state owned China Shanghai International Port Group under a 25 year management contract. Furthermore, the two states also signed an “innovative comprehensive partnership” in 2017 where bilateral ties largely became buttressed by technological and commercial interests (Xinhua, 2017).
However, despite these robust economic ties, Beijing has quietly decided to embrace a diplomatic approach of pro-Palestine neutrality towards the ongoing war. Despite taking a neutral position officially, it has sustained its criticisms towards Israel both overtly and tacitly. The latter being evident through its social and state media apparatuses. For example, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has adopted a relatively lax attitude in regulating the anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic posts which plague its digital spaces. As a result, historical conspiracy theories like Project Pufferfish, which alleged a Jewish-Imperial Japan collaborative plot to infiltrate and establish a Jewish state in Northeast China, has gained considerable traction among Chinese netizens (Kim et al., 2024). Other theories that have also flourished target the Jewish financing of Tepco, the Japanese company responsible for discharging wastewater from the Fukushima nuclear power plant, also currently a highly contentious issue within China (Davidson and Hawkins, 2023).
Similarly, in regards to the domestic state media, while it has attempted to address the attacks committed by both sides, it has primarily highlighted the atrocities committed by Israel (Kim et al., 2024). While this could primarily be attributed to the asymmetry in the scale of attacks committed by Tel Aviv especially in comparison to Hamas, Beijing’s decision to primarily focus on Israel’s “genocidal attacks” alongside its refusal to condemn Hamas ultimately illustrates a more Palestinian tilt, irrespective of its official neutral stance (CTGN, 2024). Overall, given China’s stringent online censorship and its tightly controlled social media apparatuses, the CCP’s laissez-faire attitude to the prevalence of both anti-Israeli and anti-semitic tropes online largely illustrates the party’s tacit endorsement of it.
Furthermore, since the domestic state media largely mirrors and echoes the sentiments espoused by the central party, it can be deduced that Beijing has quietly deviated from its longstanding approach of non-interference and diplomatic impartiality, evident through its overtly neutral but covert pro-Palestinian tilt. Ultimately, its pro-Palestinian neutrality risks undermining the core tenets of its nascent Global Security Initiative (GSI), which in the past two years has been lauded by Beijing as being its part and parcel of reforming the state of International Relations.
What is the GSI?
The Global Security Initiative (GSI), initially unveiled by Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Boao Forum for Asia’s annual conference in 2022, was officially articulated as a formal foreign policy strategy on February 2023 (Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2023).The initiative essentially enshrines Beijing’s foreign policy blueprint of carving out an alternative, yet contending global security architecture for governing international politics. One that largely deviates from and rivals the current US-led liberal international order (LIO). By presenting an alternative global security governance framework, Beijing aims to both, present a global panacea to the security deficit prevalent within international politics, as well as reject the global rules and norms foisted by the West as foundational principles for governing international political life (Fulton et al., 2023).
Similarly, anchored in orthodox Chinese diplomatic principles through its cosmopolitical ideals, the core tenets and principles underpinning the GSI can be regarded as contemporary iterations of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence - the latter being the GSI’s ideological precursor that served as a guiding principle orienting modern Chinese foreign policy since 1953 (Lin and Tao, 2019). The principles of peaceful co-existence consisted of five core values: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual benefit, peaceful co-existence and most importantly, the non-interference in each other’s internal affairs (Panda, 2014).
While the GSI retains the core essence of its ideological antecedent, it also promulgates a more holistic and synergy-driven approach to International Relations. For example, it emphasises core values such as: the importance of achieving a common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security in international politics, sustaining the primacy of neutral over coercive mediation, the commitment to respecting the territorial sovereignty and integrity of another state and finally, the non-interference within a state's internal affairs (Abb, 2023).
Furthermore, the GSI also consists of other ideological appendages like the Global Civilisation Initiative (GCI) and the Global Development Initiative (GDI). Taken collectively, these mutually reinforcing initiatives constitute Beijing’s part and parcel of reforming international relations (Fulton et al., 2023). By promulgating its own Weltanschauung, Beijing aims to deviate from the bounds of the intersubjective Western values system that has defined International Relations for the past eight decades.
Rather than subscribing to global rules and norms like liberal democracy, human rights, the rule of law and the liberal internationalism as universal standards governing international political life, Beijing stresses the centrality of a state defined values system. Furthermore, it largely advocates for the primacy of core principles like diplomatic impartiality, national sovereignty and most importantly, the non-interference over external intervention as the bedrock norms underpinning state relations within International Politics (Abb, 2023). The latter three principles in particular have served as the cardinal components hallmarking modern Chinese foreign policy and its diplomatic statecraft.
Examining the Hamas-Israel war in the light of the GSI
Overall, within the context of the ongoing Israel-Hamas war, it can be argued that China’s orientation towards Israel has largely belied the core principles buttressing the GSI. Despite lauding the initiatives credibility in its efficacy to broker the Iran-Saudi Arabia normalisation deal in 2023, Beijing’s pro-Palestinian neutrality and its posture towards Israel risks undermining the initiative’s principle tenets of diplomatic impartiality and non-interference. Furthermore, it also risks undermining not only its nascent mediator credentials acquired in the aftermath of the Iran-Saudi Arabia normalisation deal, but also its newfound aspirations of being an impartial entity and a credible broker that aims to “restore peace to the Middle East” (Al Jazeera, 2023).
While there might be a confluence of reasons for Beijing’s posture towards Israel, some of which might include; wanting to enhance its international standing within the global south, hostility towards Israel-US relations to espousing a sincere fraternity towards the Palestinians, these considerations, while garnering short term gains, largely undermines the credibility of the Global Security Initiative. By demonstrating the flexibility in the application of the GSI, Beijing risks not only generating long term resentments from states like Israel, but also risks eventually subjecting itself to the same criticisms of hypocrisy levied towards the West. This ultimately undermines Beijing’s grand vision of presenting the GSI and ideological appendages as credible governance alternatives to that promulgated by the West.
This article does not necessarily reflect the opinions of European Guanxi, its leadership, members, partners, or stakeholders, nor of those of its editors or staff. They have been formulated by the author in their full capacity, and shall not be used for any other purposes other than those they are intended for. European Guanxi assumes no liability or responsibility deriving from the improper use of the contents of this report. Any false facts, errors, and controversial opinions contained in the articles are proper and exclusive of the authors. European Guanxi or its staff and collaborators cannot be held responsible or legally liable for the use of any and all information contained in this document.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Jasmine Shahi holds a bachelors and masters degree from the Queen Mary University of London and the Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals. Having been raised both in Hong Kong and the UK, her research interests focus on the geopolitical security dynamics within the Indo-Pacific, particularly East Asian Security. Her graduate thesis focused on the diverging foreign policy approaches of the Republic of Korea and Japan in regards to China’s rise. She currently works as a Research Analyst at the Foreign Brief.
This article was edited by Marina Ferrero and Juan García-Nieto.
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