The upcoming 2024 European Union Parliament elections are expected to have a significant impact on European society due to the rising trends of nationalism and right-wing sentiment (Cunningham et al., 2024), with widespread ramifications for foreign and economic policy, integration, and environmental regulations. Specifically, the upcoming elections will affect European engagement with China on all fronts, as this relationship continues to increase to complexify due to points of contention such as supply chains, human rights, and environmental issues, and furthermore, the emerging question of and benefits or dangers of implementing decoupling or de-risking strategies. This article will introduce and analyse the Greens/Europe Free Alliance (GREENS/EFA) standpoint on these issues, providing insights into their policy position and strategies concerning integration and China-EU relations, and the implications for the key areas of trade, human rights, and environmental protection.
Following a Green Wave in 2019, the GREENS/EFA swept cities across the EU and ushered in an era of Green-leadership. This momentum has since reversed with the emergence of “green-lash,” where green politics have become weaponized and situated on the frontline of Europe’s cultural wars, coupled with a rise in right-wing and nationalist ideology (Graham-Harrison, 2019; Heeckt and Ripa, 2019; Marsh et al., 2023). The main pillars of the GREENS/EFA are built on protecting climate and environment, defending true democracy, reducing poverty, investing in people and ensuring equality, and safeguarding a democratic Europe while respecting the right to self-determination. The party includes members of Green movements, Pirate and Independent MEPs, Volt Europa, as well as MEPs from parties representing stateless nations and disadvantaged minorities. In total, there are 72 members consisting of 35 women and 37 men from 18 countries, 4 regions, and 25 parties (Greens-EFA, n.d.).
Regarding European integration, the party believes in EU-wide cooperation, with an emphasis on individual participation, monitoring and regulation, and moral obligation as a ‘practical imperative’ (Charter of the European Greens, 2023). Moreover, they remain open to future EU enlargements. If European nation-states act in silos, their efforts to curtail worldwide issues such as climate change and reducing emissions will prove to be inefficacious, so thus by the very nature of the goals that the GREENS/EFA address, strong European integration is a necessary factor. This has implications for the treatment of China, particularly with respect to issues of universal concern. Assuming ‘global responsibilities…for a peaceful and sustainable world’ (Charter of the European Greens, 2023), as the GREENS/EFA state, impacts how the EU should interact with China based on trade, human rights, and environment. The following section analyses the GREENS/EFA’s position on those three crucial elements of EU-China strategy.
The question of China in European politics is indeed one of fragmentation and division. The EU sees China as ‘a partner for cooperation, an economic competitor, and a strategic rival,’ which implies a strong need for strategic management to avoid undesirable consequences (EU-China Relations Factsheet, 2023). As stated in the Manifesto for Peace, Cooperation, and Human Rights (2024), which perhaps most succinctly summarises the GREEN/EFA’s stance on China:
We advocate for an active, clear-eyed, and common EU policy on China. The EU must implement a robust human rights policy that starts with de-risking our supply chains and increasing our self-sufficiency in a world with increasing climate instability and political tensions, while acknowledging that interdependence is a key factor for a peaceful international system and a global just transition.
This statement urges the EU to stop relying on authoritarian and war-mongering regimes through economic dependence, which the GREENS/EFA have taken a strong stance against in the case of Russia (Charter of the Green Party, 2023). Furthermore, to counter the Washington and Beijing Consensuses, Volt Europa puts forth in their charter the notion of expanding a “Strasbourg Consensus” to aid developing countries and promote sustainable development, which is done under the narrative that China is a strategic economic and security rival (Electoral Moonshot Program, 2023). This assumption emerges from China’s malicious trade practices and the EU’s economic entanglement with China.
Trade
In 2023, the EU trade in goods deficit with China was 291 billion EUR, which was 106 billion EUR lower when compared with 2022 (-27%) (Eurostat, 2024). Speculation from some sources indicates that this is not due to EU-initiated de-risking or decoupling, but rather that interruptions in the global supply chains impacted the import market (Lahiri, 2024). Others argue that de-risking and decoupling is part of Beijing’s plan rather than being an EU-initiated strategy (Demarais, 2024; Moller-Nielsen, 2024). As Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, stated, ‘I believe it is neither viable – nor in Europe's interest – to decouple from China. [We] need to focus on de-risk[ing] – not de-coup[ling]’ (European Commission, 2023).
German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock of the Green Party stated that ‘we must diversify ourselves economically’ (Baerbock, 2023). Nowhere in the EU China Strategic Outlook 2019 are the words “decoupling” or “de-risking” mentioned (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2019), however, within the Green Transformation of EU Trade Policy EGP Resolution adopted at the 6th EGP Congress, December 2022, China is mentioned four times, advocating for the use of trade-based tools to defend European solidarity and the internal market, as well as answering to challenges that China poses to the ‘global rules-based order’ (Green Transformation of EU Trade Policy, 2022). Furthermore, calls are made to rebalance the global system of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) by embodying and upholding democratic principles, which are also influenced by the preservation and defence of human rights.
Human Rights
The GREENS/EFA state that human rights, which are the rights of ‘all human beings, present and future’ should be a top priority of the policymaking agenda (Greens/EFA's Our Vision, n.d.). Regarding this, the Charter of the European Greens (2023) lays out the concept of global justice, stating that ‘as the global economy connects people and increases our interdependence, this moral obligation also becomes a practical imperative.’ This underscores and elevates the importance of safeguarding human rights, placing it at the forefront of policymaking from the EU-level issues to the individual. In addition, in the European Green Party’s adoption of a Resolution regarding the White Paper Revolution (2022), several recommendations were put forth demanding the EU to condemn the Communist Party of China (CCP) and urge it to respect and safeguard human rights. Working to implement human-rights-based clauses into EU agreements, the Greens/EFA’s policies are human-rights-centric, with several members of the party having been sanctioned by China for their calls for relevant protections in Xinjiang (Keller, 2021).
EFA Group President Jordi Solé remarked on the importance of preserving strategic interests on account of economic ties, while ensuring that the EU’s partners defend human rights and international law (Solé, 2022). This underscores the linkages and cohesion inherent in the GREENS/EFA’s economic and social policy, which has implications for trade. The Green Transformation of EU Trade Policy (2022) states that ‘shirts, shoes, or cars made by enslaved Uyghurs, Turkmen, or other forced workers and children from anywhere should not be sold in our shops anymore,’ directly calling out China for egregious human rights violations. Furthermore, the passing of the EU’s Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive was welcome news to the Greens/EFAs, who announced the passing of the bill as ‘long-awaited.’ Although it does not specifically mention China by name, this bill will bolster the EU’s ability to impose high environmental standards and improve labour conditions in the supply chain, thus securing human rights and exercising oversight over China’s activities. Similarly, the restructuring of trade linkages and supply chains to protect human rights is closely linked to the protection of the natural environment.
Environment
Environmental protection lies at the very core of the GREENS/EFA policies, from trade to human rights and EU integration. The European Green Deal is a mammoth proposal to accelerate the European green transition, transforming the EU into a ‘modern, resource-efficient, and competitive economy’ by ensuring no net emissions of greenhouses by 2050 (Fetting, 2020). The GREENS/EFA have repeatedly called on the European Commission to stand its ground on supporting the Green Deal (State of the European Union, 2023). Regarding China, the Green Transformation of EU Trade Policy Resolution (2022) states that ‘the EU needs to join forces…and build on a common climate protection agenda.’ Thus, with respect to the environment, the GREENS/EFA are more interested in engaging with China in areas of mutual collaboration and shared priorities rather than isolating China. The European Union has shown great promise in the areas of carbon pricing and emissions trading and has worked fervently to assist China in establishing its own Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-China ETS, n.d.). Thus, through engaging in international dialogue on environmental issues, the Greens/EFA call for a unified European strategy to engage with China.
It is expected that GREENS/EFA representation in parliament will fall to 61 from its current number of 72, with most of the current seats anticipated to be lost in Germany, France, and Italy (Ainger and Rathi, 2024; Cunningham et al., 2024). Belgian MEP Philippe Lamberts states that the Green Deal “will be a thing of the past if the far right [makes] significant gains in the…elections” (O’Carroll, 2024). As protests mount from various sectors of society, a decrease in Green representation in Parliament will only derail the green transition. With respect to China, the right’s anti-China and protectionist rhetoric may have some overlap in terms of de-risking and supply chain reshaping, particularly as a result of issues pertaining to Taiwan and Xinjiang. However, concerning environmental and social issues, the GREENS/EFA will need to continue to fight to curtail the rise in nationalism and populism.
European relations with China are becoming increasingly complex on all fronts. Following the Green wave in 2019, the Greens/EFA have been pushing extensively for protectionist measures defending European solidarity in the market, safeguarding human rights, and protecting the environment. These values have become integrated into the GREENS/EFA’s policy towards China, essentially pushing for engagement in areas of shared cooperation while ensuring that universal human rights are protected. As Europe faces pivotal choices in the face of a rising nationalist wave, the GREENS/EFA offer a vision of cooperation, solidarity, and sustainability, underscoring the importance of principled leadership in shaping a more equitable future.
This article does not necessarily reflect the opinions of European Guanxi, its leadership, members, partners, or stakeholders, nor of those of its editors or staff. They have been formulated by the author in their full capacity, and shall not be used for any other purposes other than those they are intended for. European Guanxi assumes no liability or responsibility deriving from the improper use of the contents of this report. Any false facts, errors, and controversial opinions contained in the articles are proper and exclusive of the authors. European Guanxi or its staff and collaborators cannot be held responsible or legally liable for the use of any and all information contained in this document.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Douglas Brenton Anderson is a research intern at the Hudson Institute China Center located in Washington DC. His current research focuses on national security and geopolitics. He holds an MA in Public Policy Administration from Tsinghua University, Beijing, and an MSc in Innovation, Human Development, and Sustainability from the University of Geneva, Switzerland. He has previously worked in government at the local, regional, and national level, as well as in an international organization in the humanitarian sector, focusing on digital innovation. He enjoys travel, having been to 41 cities in China, and is proficient in Mandarin and French.
This article was edited by Marina Ferrero and Luca Rastelli.
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