Europe and China’s International Development Cooperation Narratives: Conflicting yet Converging

European Guanxi
5 days ago
8 min read

Introduction

Combined, the efforts by EU institutions and Member States make the European Union the largest international development cooperation donor in the world. Its wealth and post-colonial linkages with less developed and developing countries allow the EU to play a major role in contributing to the latter’s road to development. Indeed, it is commonly argued that the dismantling of colonial empires and the wave of independence that started in the aftermath of the Second World War gave birth to modern development aid, as a way for old colonial powers to maintain part of their influence. Not by chance, countries such as the U.K. and France, together with the U.S., through the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), have long set the rules of the game. In other words, development aid was born as a North-to-South endeavour, one in which developed donors concede aid to less developed recipients.

Already in 1955, at the Afro-Asian Conference of Bandung, Indonesia, which planted the seeds of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), a different understanding was emerging with the concept of South-South Cooperation (SSC). The latter centred on the promotion of mutual interests and cooperation between newly independent states as well as on defending their sovereignty from any pressure or interference by external powers. This challenge was reflected in the creation of coalitions (e.g., G77), international organisations (e.g., Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries – OPEC), and even attempts from the OECD itself to adopt more inclusive language and approaches (for instance, increasingly replacing the word 'aid' with 'cooperation'). However, North-South and donor-recipient dichotomies entered a veritable crisis only at the turn of the new millennium, as countries such as China, India, Brazil, South Africa, Russia, the East Asian Tigers, and the Arab oil-exporting countries experienced rapid economic growth. Indeed, while the share of development cooperation financing provided by these countries has been growing considerably, the unevenness of their development and their relatively low per capita GDP levels still allow many of them to preserve the right to receive Official Development Assistance (ODA). In other words, the Global North now experiences competition on the donor side by countries that contextually remain also recipients of aid; the North-South paradigm is not suited to grasp the full picture.

Among these new actors, China has arguably had the greatest impact on the sector. Not only has it managed to lift around 800 million of its citizens out of poverty in the last 40 years, but it has become a global economic superpower in the process; in 2021, China had by far the largest trade surplus in the world. Beijing is using this power to build increasingly strong ties with the Global South, as evidenced by the fact that in 2023, at least a fifth of all South-South trade flows involved China. Moreover, China’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the last thirty years has grown from a mere 1.7% of the total world’s share to a peak of 14.7% in 2022. For comparison, Chinese FDI in 2023 roughly corresponded to the sum of FDI by Brazil, India, South Africa and West Asia combined.

The increased agency of Beijing in development cooperation affairs in the last two decades is well exemplified by the launch of the ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, as well as by its engagement with multilateral forums such as the BRICS’ New Development Bank (NDB) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), both founded in 2014. Beijing regards its foreign assistance as part of a model of international relations that ‘falls into the category of South-South cooperation and therefore is essentially different from North-South cooperation’. Such a narrative has begun to influence traditional North-South cooperation and the approach of established development powers to international development cooperation.

The Chinese Model of International Development Cooperation

The first thing to consider when it comes to the Chinese understanding of development cooperation is that China, although having recently signalled a partial shift by giving up its developing country status for World Trade Organisation (WTO) negotiations, still regards itself as ‘the largest developing country in the world’ (Foreword). This does not mean that China does not acknowledge its role as a major country, permanent member of the UN Security Council and trading superpower, but it does entail a belief in 'common but differentiated responsibilities', which make the North-South cooperation the main channel for international development cooperation - with richer former colonies owing to poorer countries a fair share - and SSC its complement.

The programmatic document ‘China’s International Development Cooperation in the New Era’ (2021) clearly enunciates the main tenets of Chinese strategy and understanding of international development cooperation. China declared its mission as promoting a ‘global community of shared future’, which means contributing to narrowing the North-South gap and establishing ‘a new model of international relations based on mutual respect, equity, justice and win-win cooperation…’. This includes pursuing the greater good and shared interests, as well as focusing on SSC and helping developing countries achieve the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The BRI, aimed at promoting ‘policy, infrastructure, trade, financial and people-to-people connectivity’ among countries, plays a major role in these efforts. The principles informing its approach include reciprocal respect, non-interference, and no conditionalities. China’s development cooperation must also provide for independent development, ensure proper management, adhere to sustainability, promote exchanges and mutual learning in the spirit of openness, and introduce reforms and innovations while remaining true to its own principles.

This is the world China presents, but reality is far more multifaceted; for instance, many scholars and commentators extended accusations to China concerning the creation of 'debt traps', and some countries, such as Greece, made political concessions to Beijing in anticipation of or after important Chinese investments in their territories. Be that as it may, while it is important to bear in mind the distance that always occurs between narrative and reality, a country’s narrative remains an interesting point of observation, maintaining its own specific weight and practical implications in international politics and diplomacy.

Recent Evolution of the EU Approach: Chinese Competition and Mutual Influences

The question is whether China’s rise as a major actor in the development cooperation sector, its focus on win-win partnerships and non-interference, and the use of infrastructural investments as a principal means of cooperation, have affected the evolution of the EU approach in the past decades.

When it comes to China’s win-win partnership narrative, there is evidence of the EU gradually substituting the word 'aid' with 'partnership' in EU development cooperation strategic documents, financing instruments, and regional partnership agreements in the last two decades. For instance, in 2021, the EU Commission launched the Global Gateway, its new flagship development cooperation vehicle, with a communication containing the word 'partnership' 94 times and the word ‘aid’ not even once. In the same year, the EU Commission Directorate General (DG), which deals with development cooperation, was renamed 'DG International Partnerships' (DG INTPA).

These changes can be attributed to increased competition and to the win-win narrative pioneered by China, as clearly explained in a DG INTPA briefing book leaked by Politico. It is explicitly written that renaming the DG represents ‘a paradigm shift in the way the European Commission approaches international partnerships’ and ‘derives from a recognition that Europe needed to move away from obsolete donor-recipient dynamics and position itself more boldly in an increasingly contested international environment’. In summation, this rebranding aims to position the EU as ‘a positive offer for its partners’ rather than a paternalistic donor, as development has increasingly become a ‘market of offers’ from which recipient countries can ‘pick and choose from a menu as they see fit’. There is no more speaking of aid, but only of openly interest-driven partnership: ‘In assisting others, the EU will also be contributing to the promotion of its own interests, to strengthening the resilience of its supply chains, and to opening up more trade opportunities for the EU economy’.

Another ‘lesson learned’ from China is that major infrastructural investments make cooperation efforts more visible and appealing. Currently, the EU flagship development cooperation initiative is the Global Gateway, which focuses ‘on physical infrastructure to strengthen digital, transport and energy networks’. The paper, ‘Partnership in a Geopolitical Era: Time for a New Strategic Conversation’, written by three important European think tanks and commissioned by the European Commission in preparation for the October 2025 Global Gateway Forum, explicitly frames the initiative as a ‘response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative’. Enhanced competition and a greater focus on major infrastructures require higher investments, increasingly involving the private sector in what is defined as a ‘financialisation’ of development cooperation. Therefore, there is not merely a change of narrative, but also practical implications with vital significance. For instance, greater involvement of the private sector and a higher focus on investment returns for the donor risk reduce financing opportunities for less-equipped Least Developed Countries (LDCs), which, paradoxically, are those who need such investments the most.

Finally, when it comes to non-interference, major shifts on the EU side towards limiting political conditionalities are not particularly visible: the focus on human rights, transparency and sustainability is far from neglected in the EU approach. From this point of view, a gradual convergence is more visible from the Chinese side. Faced with high investment risks in corruption-ridden or unstable countries, China is debating a pragmatic shift from a strict 'non-interference' approach to one of 'constructive involvement', although officially remaining committed to the former.

Conclusion

Examining the EU and China, both crucial actors in the international development cooperation arena, allows for a clearer understanding of the recent evolutions in the sector. International development cooperation, formerly a dominion of the Global North, has become a contested field where multiple actors interact according to diverging development models and national priorities, although simultaneously facing global challenges calling for collective efforts (e.g., SDGs). A rhetoric of partnership has superseded the traditional donor-to-recipient aid framework as a way to make investments more attractive both to partner countries and private investors in a crowded competition for global influence and secure supply chains. International development cooperation is increasingly part of broader agreements encompassing issues such as trade, security and migration. Partnerships in this sense are now more openly interest-driven; this does not mean that donors’ interests were never part of the picture before, and neither does this mean that enhanced transparency will automatically lead to fairer agreements. It is true, however, that in the current competitive context, better-equipped recipient countries may be able to negotiate from a stronger position.

As far as the EU and China are concerned, they appear to be potential competitors (e.g., for influence in third countries) just as much as potential partners (e.g., in sustaining third countries’ green development). What is certain is that the race for development cooperation is inextricably linked to economic competition and global political influence. Now that the US has considerably reduced its role in this race, the stakes for these two key actors to fill the resulting void have never been higher.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Andrea Crinò is an intern at TIM on EU Policy and Regulatory Affairs; co-founder and Secretary of the association Io Parlo Europeo, promoting debate in Italy on the European Union, its functioning, its founding principles, and its future; and volunteer Project Officer at Magic Amor ETS, an NGO working on development cooperation projects in the DRC. Graduated from a double master's degree in international relations, he is deeply interested in EU-China relations (studies Chinese language too), development cooperation, and the digital and environmental transitions.

This article was edited by Nika Tatoshvili and Rory O'Connor.