EU-China Competition for Digital Connectivity in the Western Balkans: The Digital Silk Road as a Litmus Test for EU Enlargement Credibility

Introduction  

Since 2015, China has intensified efforts to export Sino-centric digital technologies to both developed and developing markets through the launch of the Digital Silk Road (DSR). Initially an all-encompassing term for digital connectivity projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the DSR has rapidly become a central instrument of China’s foreign policy, aimed at exporting Sino-centric digital infrastructure, e-commerce, fibre-optic cables, and AI technologies. While framed as a vehicle for digital development and innovation among partner countries, the DSR also carries undeniable geopolitical and geoeconomic weight. The role of fibre-optic cables as a key political-economic connector across countries – as well as Huawei’s ties with the People’s Liberation Army – raise concerns that Chinese authorities could exploit personal data to advance mass surveillance goals. These technologies confer strategic leverage, enabling the DSR to promote a Sino-centric ‘authoritarian’ model for digital governance, directly challenging the EU's regulatory influence and the competitiveness of EU digital companies. 

The Western Balkans in particular has emerged as a priority region for the DSR, given its strategic position as both a gateway between Western Europe and Eurasia, and a potential backdoor into the EU’s digital market through candidate countries such as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia or Serbia. China's growing embedment in regional critical infrastructure, particularly 5G networks and smart-city solutions, exposes the Western Balkans to vulnerabilities over data privacy, national security, cybersecurity, and geopolitical interference. As the EU seeks to turn enlargement into a 'geostrategic priority' in the next Multiannual Financial Framework (2028-2034) and aims to close accession negotiations before 2030 with Montenegro and Albania, the DSR threatens to complicate candidate countries’ alignment with EU digital norms. This increasingly turns the Western Balkans into a litmus test for the EU’s ability to safeguard its geopolitical presence in its immediate neighbourhood, advance the region’s alignment with its rules-based, human-centric digital governance model and implement a coherent, EU-wide strategy toward China.

China’s Digital Ambitions in the Western Balkans amid Keen Cooperation and Reluctant Engagement 

China has achieved significant breakthroughs in the Western Balkans, with DSR-related projects concluded in five out of the six Western Balkans countries (WB6), including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia. Its implementation has  been further facilitated by formalised bilateral cooperation with five of the WB6 (excluding  Kosovo) under the 14+1 cooperation forum, while all WB6 have signed an MoU to take part in the BRI. The region’s gap in available financing tools to meet its needs for digital infrastructure represents another key factor for their eagerness to engage the DSR. Each country’s engagement with China in digital and telecommunications infrastructure has varied considerably, shaped by the relative importance of NATO alignment and aspirations for EU membership in its strategic thinking: while Serbia has pursued close strategic cooperation, Albania, North Macedonia and Kosovo have adopted cautious and limited engagement; Montenegro has followed a middle-ground approach contrasting with Bosnia and Herzegovina’s fragmented and ambiguous engagement. 

Serbia has led regional engagement with the DSR as part of its multi-vector foreign policy, which seeks simultaneous engagement with China, the EU, the U.S. and Russia. As such, Belgrade has concluded several agreements for DSR-related projects ranging from telecommunications, digital transformation, to 5G networks. Although repeated warnings from Washington and Brussels have pushed Serbia to join the U.S. Clean Network in 2020 – an initiative aiming at building U.S.-led cross-continental digital networks that exclude China – Huawei has continuously strengthened its digital foothold in the country. The tech giant is currently working on more than 40 local surveillance networks and several smart-city infrastructures, providing strategic cloud infrastructure for the development of an AI platform for state utilisation, while remaining Serbia’s state-owned Telecom Srbija’s primary partner for the installation of 5G infrastructure and fibre-optic networks. These projects, which incorporate Huawei-based facial recognition and CCTV networks, have triggered concerns over mass surveillance from the EU. Simultaneously, the embedment of Chinese telecommunications and smart-city technologies has sparked debates over the emergence of coveted entry points that could easily be leveraged for cyber attacks, as well as forms of strategic leverage that could more broadly undermine regional security.

Meanwhile, Bosnia and Herzegovina has pursued a fractured, ambiguous engagement under the DSR, an approach heavily influenced by its unique constitutional setup, which divides authority between two ethnically based entities with conflicting views on relations with the U.S. and the EU. Republika Srpska has promoted Chinese investment in digital projects to deflect pressure from the EU, while Huawei has deepened cooperation with the state-owned company Telekom Srpske to expand local high speed internet and connectivity. By contrast, in view of its aspirations for EU membership, the Federation of Bosnia has adopted a more cautious approach. These conflicting policies between the two constituencies expose Bosnia and Herzegovina to fragmented digital standards, adding a layer of complexity in its efforts to ensure regulatory alignment with the EU. Nevertheless, China continues to play a prominent role in setting up advanced telecommunications infrastructure: Bosnia and Herzegovina has joined Huawei’s Seed for the Future project, which aims to build regional 5G, AI and cybersecurity training capabilities. Moreover, its leading telecom provider concluded a network-upgrade contract with Huawei in 2024, while Sarajevo’s authorities have partnered with Huawei on smart-city solutions since 2018. 

In spite of its near-insolvency crisis triggered by Chinese lending for the BRI-backed Bar-Boljare highway project, Montenegro has followed a middle-ground engagement with the DSR, marked by the absence of a clear policy on Huawei and on the security risks surrounding Beijing's role in 5G network rollout. Montenegro has not joined the U.S. Clean Network, nor has it forced Huawei to halt its long standing presence in the country’s telecommunications infrastructure, despite its status as a NATO Member and an aspiring EU candidate. Huawei has been involved in the expansion of the 3G network alongside Montenegro Telekom since 2011, while collaborating with the country’s second-largest ICT firm, m:tel, on phone devices. Despite increasing vigilance over potential risks of engagement with untrusted vendors – as evidenced by its choice of EU companies Ericsson and Nokia for its 5G rollout – Montenegro has not explicitly excluded Chinese firms from its 5G networks. These choices create new risks for the country’s alignment with EU digital standards, as reliance on Chinese technologies could jeopardise cybersecurity and sensitive information. 

Albania and North Macedonia, both NATO Members and EU candidates, have opted for more cautious engagement with the DSR, balancing good economic relations with China with an increasingly Western-oriented foreign policy. The two countries have joined the U.S. Clean Network Initiative and aligned their policies with U.S. and EU standards for electronic  communications and digital infrastructure, signing an MoU on the security of 5G technologies against ‘untrusted vendors’. Under the impetus of its new government and NATO membership, North Macedonia has amended its law on electronic communications in 2025 to better align with EU standards, effectively banning Chinese firms' participation in the 5G rollout, instead favouring Sweden’s Ericsson. This marked a significant departure from previous 3G and 4G networks procurement carried out by Huawei and ZTE, while effectively halting Huawei’s long-standing presence in the country since 2010. Nevertheless, Telekom Srbija’s, known for its partnership with Huawei, continued operations in the country, which has raised security concerns over its digital infrastructure. Similarly, Albania is undergoing revision of its legal framework for electronic communications, with a focus on 5G networks to align more closely with the EU's Electronic Communications Code. After China failed to implement concrete BRI projects in Albania, the country took decisive steps to distance itself from cooperation with Chinese companies on digitalisation and data transfer projects: Albania selected Sweden’s Ericsson as the sole provider of 5G networks in the country amid U.S. pressures, ceased Vodafone Albania’s anticipated partnership with Huawei for the implementation of 5G infrastructure, and stopped using Chinese equipment for existing and future telecommunications infrastructure. However, the fact that One Albania is owned by the Hungarian firm 4iG, which maintains close relations with Huawei, could pose additional challenges. Albania and North Macedonia continue to struggle with residual Chinese influence in its digital infrastructure via indirect partnerships and legacy contracts, which, although limited, present risks for data protection and more broadly, long-term alignment with EU digital regulations.

Kosovo has been the most cautious in the region to engage with China’s DSR, largely driven by political motives related to Beijing’s close partnership with Belgrade and its lack of diplomatic recognition of Pristina, as well as its strong strategic alignment with the U.S. and the EU. Kosovo has long expressed reluctance to join the DSR over fears of jeopardising its overarching aspirations for EU accession and NATO membership. This is evidenced by its participation in Washington’s Clean Network Initiative and the signing of a bilateral agreement with the U.S. in 2020, explicitly excluding Chinese firms from the country’s telecommunications infrastructure and 5G rollout, in an attempt to preserve its reliance on Western-oriented providers. Kosovo has also become increasingly mindful of the risks associated with heavy dependence on Chinese financing, as a result of the experiences of other states in the region, and has therefore avoided cooperation with Huawei, despite previous limited collaboration in hardware and software with the state-owned telecommunications firm Vala.

Balancing China's Digital Expansion: The EU’s Pushback against the DSR in the Western Balkans

Despite important economic and connectivity benefits, the DSR’s increasing involvement in the Western Balkans’ digital infrastructure directly jeopardises the EU’s geopolitical influence in the region and the Western Balkans’ accession process to the organisation. Firstly, the expansion of Chinese-led BRI and DSR initiatives has exposed the WB6 to a wide range of economic and financial risks, including debt exposure, opaque agreements, privacy violations, weak accountability, and a lack of transparency standards. These dynamics significantly hinder the WB6’s efforts to align with the EU’s digital standards. Secondly, cybersecurity risks cannot be ignored given the Chinese government’s oversight of its technology sector. Although China’s power-based cyberactivities in the Western Balkans remain in their early stages, the relative openness of Montenegro and Republika Srpska to Beijing’s intrusion of their digital infrastructure, in addition to Serbia’s ironclad strategic partnership with China in surveillance and monitoring technologies, create significant vulnerabilities for the affected Western Balkan states. These openings could facilitate anti-Western disinformation campaigns, espionage, and the takeover of large systems embedded with Chinese technologies, posing direct threats to the WB6’s cyber resilience and national security. Finally, since the EU has recently renewed its commitment to integrate new Member States – notably Montenegro and Albania – under its 2025 Enlargement Package, China’s growing footprint risks further eroding public confidence and political momentum for a credible enlargement by 2030. In fact, the advancement of an alternative Sino-centric digital governance model clearly hinders EU’s accession prospects, dependent on candidates’ gradual internalisation of EU laws, norms and institutions, including in the digital realm. 

The EU has moved to counter the growing influence of the DSR by articulating a comprehensive and credible alternative grounded in a sustainable, transparent and rules-based vision for digital connectivity. In 2021, the EU launched its connectivity strategy, the Global Gateway, as a counterweight to the BRI, mobilising 30 billion EUR across the Global South and the Western Balkans, with digital and telecommunications infrastructure assuming a central role. Together with the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans (2024-2027), which directly contributes to the Global Gateway, the EU has pledged €9 billion for 68 flagship regional connectivity projects, such as the deployment of next-generation networks in Montenegro, and started opening its Digital Single Market for regional partners. These initiatives have placed digital transformation at the centre of the EU’s regional integration efforts, aiming to accelerate convergence with the Union on the digital economy, as persistent regulatory and technical gaps have largely driven WB6's keen engagement with the DSR. Beyond investment and technical support, the EU has institutionalised cooperation with the Western Balkans under regulatory dialogues for the digital transformation, aiming to align digital governance frameworks with strong EU norms, spanning areas from cybersecurity, safe digital market, high-capacity networks like 5G, to ethical AI deployment. Regulatory convergence has been further facilitated by WB6’s participation in the Digital Europe Programme, allocating strategic funding for the development of advanced AI, cybersecurity, supercomputing or semiconductor infrastructure and skills. Additionally, the planned rollout of European Digital Innovation Hubs will serve as regional footholds for digital innovation and capacity-building. They will also accelerate alignment with EU regulations, including the Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act, providing a comprehensive legal framework for a safer online space, which is currently lacking in the region. The EU’s multi-pronged approach in combining large-scale investment, regulatory dialogues, and technical support for capacity-building has strengthened European companies’ presence in regional digital infrastructure modernisation, with Nokia and Ericsson taking the lead for the rollout of 5G networks, offering a tangible counterweight to Chinese projects. Building on the precedent set by the U.S. Clean Network – which has curtailed Chinese companies' engagement in 5G infrastructure in Kosovo, Albania and North Macedonia – the EU has also consolidated its geopolitical influence by increasingly counterbalancing the DSR's digital governance model with a standards-based, sustainable, and transparent alternative.

Nevertheless, internal divisions among Member States regarding cooperation with China on the DSR continue to entangle the EU’s position in the WB6. This fragmentation emerges from the absence of a consistent, EU-wide stance toward China, despite a tentative framing of 'partnership, competition and rivalry' in its China Outlook 2019. This constrains the EU’s ability to speak with one voice and to act proactively rather than reactively. A coherent EU approach is further compromised by the tendency of individual Member States to adopt unilateral measures in response to several aspects of China’s conduct. National one-sided initiatives – such as Italy and Germany’s recent efforts to impede Chinese AI chatbot, DeepSeek, from transferring EU citizens’ personal data – further fragment regulatory responses while stiffening the articulation of a unified EU-wide strategy, which in turn, strengthens the cacophony and reactivity of the EU’s approach to China. 

Compounding this challenge is the EU's inability to establish uniform rules across all Member States on key aspects of digital technology regulation, including a single, integrated cybersecurity framework applicable to all networkable products sold within the Single Market, which further complicates candidate countries' efforts to align with EU rules. For instance, while the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans recognises 5G-related cybersecurity challenges and calls for bolstered capacities in accordance with the EU Toolbox for 5G Security, it falls short of concrete implementation measures to mitigate cybersecurity risks to 5G networks. These internal shortcomings are further exacerbated by Huawei’s continued engagement in digital networks across the Western Balkans and within the EU itself. Some Member States have openly resisted the EU Toolbox for 5G Security’s ban on high-risk vendors, including Hungary – whose telecommunication giant 4iG is known for its cooperation with Huawei – and Germany’s continued reliance on Huawei in its 5G network. Huawei and ZTE also remain active in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Montenegro’s networks. Altogether, these factors significantly constrain the EU’s ability to exclude China from regional digital infrastructure, while divergences among the WB6 governments in strategic alignment with Brussels or Beijing, administrative divisions, and varying levels of digital regulatory maturity add a layer of complexity to the region’s convergence with EU standards.

Conclusion 

China’s Digital Silk Road (DSR) has achieved significant breakthroughs in the Western Balkans by leveraging promises of enhanced connectivity and digital-driven growth. DSR-related projects have been concluded in five out of the six WB6, excluding Kosovo, although the level of engagement has varied according to their respective commitment to EU and NATO memberships. However, the growing integration of Chinese digital technologies into the region’s 5G networks and smart-city solutions exposes the WB6 to vulnerabilities in privacy, data security and cybersecurity, with long-term implications for the EU’s geopolitical presence, enlargement process and the competitiveness of EU firms. 

In response, the EU has deployed an array of countervailing tools spanning large-scale investments, technical support, and regulatory alignment, promoting a sustainable, transparent and  rules-based vision for digital transformation, which strengths its role as a key digital partner for the region. Nevertheless, enduring fragmentation among Member States over Huawei’s presence and engagement with China, combined with uneven national implementation of digital technology regulations, undermines the coherence of the EU counterstrategy to the DSR, limiting its ability to shape the Western Balkans’ digital future and integration prospects. 

Amid enlargement fatigue in the Western Balkans, the EU could reassert its geopolitical foothold in the region by promoting a values-based digital strategy, framed in alignment with the region’s accession interests and ability to offset the appeal of China’s state-directed digital authoritarian model. The EU’s International Digital Strategy of June 2025 represents a first attempt to project its digital policy strategically by expanding the EU's global network of partners. Nevertheless, the document lacks explicit reference to the WB6 beyond ongoing initiatives under the regional Growth Plan, and fails to embed a tailored digital framework to support its accession process, thus, unable to address the EU concerns over the competition for digital connectivity in the Western Balkans. 

To address this gap, the EU should first articulate a cohesive political agenda designed for the  Western Balkans’ digital future that aligns its normative principles with geopolitical constraints and strategically prioritised key technologies. This agenda can be supported through integrated public-private packages combining soft elements, including digital skills training, with hard components of digital development; notably technical maintenance and financing arrangements as envisioned by the International Strategy’s Tech Business Offer. The Union should also pursue co-creation partnerships for secure, localised digital infrastructures by expanding the European Digital Public Infrastructure Consortium to aspiring Member States, thereby promoting both diversification from Chinese technologies and deeper adherence to the EU’s digital rule-setting. Secondly, the Union should integrate conditionality clauses on candidates’ engagement with China into accession negotiations, thereby enhancing the operability of its China policy within the enlargement process, as the traditional framework inadequately captures the current realities of Sino-EU ties. Digital chapters should include concrete compliance targets, covering security assessments for high-risk vendors via the adoption of the EU 5G Toolbox, as well as robust procurement transparency standards and vendor diversification quotas to mitigate risks stemming from China’s penetration of critical digital infrastructure in the region. 

The views expressed in this article belong to the author(s) alone and do not necessarily reflect those of European Guanxi.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Ines Miral is a young professional specialising in digital, emerging technology and economic security policies with a particular focus on EU relations with East Asia. She holds a Double Master’s in Asian and European Affairs from King’s College London and Renmin University and has worked as a trainee for the EU Delegation to South Korea as well as leading European think tanks, including Institut Montaigne and the German Institute for Global and Area Studies.

This article was edited by Daria Bogolyubova and Mengfei Xu.

Featured Image: Moračica bridge over the Morača river, part of the new highway Bar-Boljare in Montenegro  / Free for use / Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International license.