China’s First Encounter with Modern Western Diplomacy: The Treaty of Nerchinsk

Treaty of Nerchinsk. 1689. This work is in the public domain, PDM 1.0

At the end of the summer of 1689, deep in Siberia, in the town of Nerchinsk, the soon-to-become Russian Empire and the Chinese Empire signed the first of a series of treaties that would impact their relations for all of the modern era.

Both China and Russia were seeing an age of expansion and prosperity: after emerging from a phase of political instability often referred to as смутное время, “time of troubles” and with the rise of the Romanovs in the 17th century, Russia had managed to continue the expansion begun in the previous century before and expand its territories east, through Siberia, to the Bering Sea .

However, the territory gained by Russia through its colonisation of Siberia meant that it had a powerful new neighbour, one that could not be ignored and with whom the demarcation lines had never been clearly defined. The Qing dynasty had replaced the Ming as the reigning dynasty of China merely a few decades before, but was already living in a golden age, with Kangxi 康熙 (1654-1722) as its ruling emperor.

The occasion to discuss in depth the frontier problem presented itself in September 1685, when the Chinese army began its siege of the Albazin fort, located on the banks of the Amur river, or Heilongjiang 黑龙江 as it is known in Chinese. The fort had been established by Cossacks around three decades prior on land that belonged to the Daur nomadic tribe. Of Mongolian descent, this population was tributary to the Qing dynasty and often reiterated their allegiance when pressured by Russians to pay the “yasak”, the tsarist state’s version of tribute, usually consisting of furs. The Chinese army had attempted multiple times since the 1650s to come to the Daur’s aid and expel the Cossacks from their territory, but they hadn’t succeeded; almost forty years later, however, they did accomplish their mission, albeit briefly. Once the Albazinians who had fled to the nearby town of Nerchinsk ascertained that the Chinese forces had left the premises for good, they quickly returned and reoccupied the fort. The Chinese siege of the fort began once again, lasting for several months and was ultimately halted by the Qing government when they received news of a diplomatic envoy dispatched from Moscow to initiate the peace negotiation. The delegations were led by Earl Fëdor Alekseevič Golovin on the Russian part and Songgotu 索额图, uncle of the Empress, on the Chinese part and, while it has been difficult for historians to pinpoint the exact days in which they were held due the usage of different systems of calendars, lasted almost a month, culminating with all of the involved parties’ signatures at the end of August.

According to historical accounts, the length of the negotiations and the multiple misunderstandings were due to contrasting goals and incompatible expectations on the outcomes of the treaty. However, upon closer analysis, another key factor becomes evident: the fundamentally different approaches to diplomacy and international relations.In January and October 1648, two peace treaties were signed in Europe, the first being the Treaty of Osnabrück and the second being the Treaty of Münster; marking the end of the Thirty Years’ War, they became later known as Peace of Westphalia, after the German region to which the two cities belonged. While it may seem an unrelated event, the Peace of Westphalia is widely recognised by international law experts as having set the basis and codified the principles of modern diplomacy and to be the first instance where the concept of sovereignty of states was introduced, whether explicitly or implicitly.

In the forty years between the Peace of Westphalia and the events of Nerchinsk, Russia had fought and engaged with European powers at length, most prominently with Poland, with whom signed a treaty in 1667 following a war that lasted over a decade. The soon-to-become empire was thus familiar both with the rules of the jus gentium (law of nations) and with the relatively new dynamics that were taking shape under the emerging concept of mutual recognition of authority, and by extension, equality. However, the Westphalian principles and the European normative core of values only arrived in China in 1864, when William A.P. Martin translated Henry Wheaton’s “Elements of International Law” into Chinese for the Jingshi Tongwenguan (京师同文馆), the Qing Empire’s official institute for translation.

China had, for centuries, based its foreign policy on what scholars have called a tributary system; the Qing had inherited it from the Ming and scholars had initially classified it as a trade system. This inherently hierarchical model, where the centrality of one state is deeply intertwined with ethics and the Confucian values of filial piety, clashed significantly with the Western interstate relations values and thus led to many misunderstandings during the negotiations of the Treaty of Nerchinsk, which was the first instance in which China engaged with a Western power on a legal basis.

In light of this, Jesuits Jean-François Gerbillon and Tomaso Pereira played a key role,  despite being part of the Chinese delegation and having been appointed as Latin translators;  They were quite well-versed both in the Spanish-Portuguese theory of International Law and in the jus naturae et gentium (Law of nature and nations) and thus, acted as mediators in the negotiations and mitigated the conflicts, remaining impartial on more than one occasion. The first instance happened before the negotiations had officially started: going against what had been mutually agreed upon, the Chinese delegation arrived in the concurred location accompanied by 700 soldiers. This was interpreted by the Russians as a breach of the agreements first, and a sign of hostility second. Only the relentless mediation of the Jesuits and the explanation to both parties of their counterpart’s point of view made it possible to proceed and begin the actual negotiations.

This was not the only occurrence in which the Chinese delegation would resort to intimidatory strategies throughout the length of the discussions. The demarcation of the frontier was the most pressing issue for both parties and neither was initially willing to concede, leading to tense days of negotiations and scarce results. In between the discussions, there is a window of around ten days which has been referred to by some scholars as ‘Siege of Nerchinsk’, the town closest to where the negotiations were happening and which would later give its name to the namesake Treaty. The Chinese soldiers had begun the blockade merely a few days after the first discussions had taken place and had also managed to recruit a large number of Mongols from nearby tribes, putting the Russian delegation at a strategic disadvantage.

From a modern perspective, this continuous use of military tactics could also be considered a symptom of the lack of knowledge of European international relations core values by the Chinese; however, it is worth noting that resolving disputes through wars, instead of diplomatic efforts, was still widespread throughout the 17th century. Once again, the altercation was resolved through the mediation of one of the Latin interpreters, who reminded the parties involved that, according to the rules of jus gentium, reaching an agreement through blackmail was not feasible.

The Russian delegates were the ones to concede on multiple occasions, including in the matters regarding the demarcation of the borders and the fate of the Albazin fort. However, their Chinese counterparts, who placed confidence in the assessments of Gerbillon and Pereira, also recalibrated their diplomatic stance and their requests accordingly when pointed out to be in the wrong or to be acting based on prejudice against the Russians.

This is exemplified, first of all, by the fact that the final Treaty was redacted and signed in a total of three languages: Russian, Manchu and Latin. The use of the last is particularly important as, in the practice of international law, the document issued in the agreed-upon lingua franca is the one used as the reference in case of misunderstanding and differences in the other drafts.

Further evidence of the evolution in diplomatic posture of the Qing delegation can be found in the preamble of the Treaty itself, where, in all of its versions, the respect for the principle of sovereignty and mutual recognition of equality is clearly articulated through the choices made for the sobriquets of the respective rulers. Nowhere in the documents is Kangxi referred to as “Sovereign of the Whole World”, as had been the convention, and the sobriquets used reflected a mutual position of power, where neither ruler was superior to the other.

In particular, the sobriquets employed for the Chinese Emperor were “Sancti Sinarum Imperatoris” in the Latin version, “Lord of all the major Asian states” in the Russian version and “Holy Emperor of the Middle Kingdom” in the Manchu version, whereas the Tsars Ivan and Peter were referred to as “Dei Gratia Magnorum Dominatorum Tzarum Magnorumque” in Latin, “Imperial Majesties, Rulers, Tsars and Grand Dukes” in Russian and “Khan of Russia” in Manchu. 

The Aeternum Foedus (eternal pact) of the Treaty of Nerchinsk lasted approximately another forty years; the relations between the two Empires would then be renewed  in 1727 through the Treaty of Kyakhta first and again in 1851 through the Treaty of Kulija.

However, it marked the beginning of an intricate and enduring relationship between the two Empires, exemplified by the establishment of the frontier post of Kyakhta, where merchants from both the territories would meet in order to trade goods and conduct business. Kyakhta would quickly grow to become an important hub of cultural interactions and nexus of commercial activities. 

The commercial relations that were built over time mirrored the roles established in the Treaty of Nerchinsk; despite occasional misunderstandings between the two parties, neither side actively sought to dominate over the other, nor did the nature of the commercial exchanges slowly shifted towards a tributary system. 

The mutual respect on which this relationship was built came to a halt at the end of the 19th century when the dynamics of the geopolitical system shifted following the Opium wars. Russia’s growing hierarchical superiority would then be ratified by the Treaty of Aigun of 1858, in which the frontier between the two Empires is further modified in favour of the Russians. This Treaty was the result of military coercion from the Russian part and thus marked the beginning of what scholars have called the era of the 不平等条约 (unequal treaties) for Sino-Russians relations. 

The Treaty of Nerchinsk is still considered by scholars to be the first documented case in which the Chinese Empire participated in diplomacy based on non-tributary principles and the first ever Chinese treaty in which both parties are explicitly regarded as equals, thus marking a significant milestone in the history of modern Chinese international relations.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Chiara Bertucci is currently a PhD student at Sapienza University of Rome; she specialises in Qing–Russian imperial relations during the 18th and 19th centuries. With a background in Chinese and Russian studies, her research focuses on frontier dynamics and cross-linguistic interactions between the two empires.