Balancing Wires and Power: Europe’s Search for Digital Autonomy in the Age of China

Introduction

Within an increasingly competitive and interdependent international system, geopolitical competition is becoming more focused on new technologies. The field has become both a driver of prosperity and a tool of power, including within the evolving EU-China relationship. Digital infrastructures, innovation policies, and security concerns are now reshaping not only trade dynamics but also the political dialogue between the European Union and China on issues ranging from artificial intelligence (AI) to green supply chains. The EU is trying to balance between interdependence and its pursuit of digital sovereignty, while China’s tech rise grants Beijing both economic leverage and growing influence in setting global standards. As power shifts from territory to technology, Europe faces the challenge of maintaining openness while remaining strategically autonomous.

From Innovation to Influence: How Technology Became the Core of Global Power Politics

In the twenty-first century, technological capability has become a key factor shaping geopolitical influence: semiconductors, AI, telecommunications networks, and digital platforms are no longer simply digital infrastructure – they have become instruments of power. As a result, the global technology architecture is being reshaped as nations, regional blocs, and corporations compete for leadership in critical areas such as AI, 6G, quantum computing, and semiconductor production. For the EU, this transformation represents a dual challenge: on one hand, the Union must maintain open markets and globally interconnected innovation systems. On the other hand, refining the strategy that defines China as a partner, competitor, and systematic rival reflects the complex balancing act between cooperation and caution. 

This approach also mirrors the EU’s official framing of China as a partner for cooperation, an economic competitor, and a systemic rival – a characterisation that, as noted in Calcara’s (2025) analysis on European autonomy, encapsulates the effort to maintain engagement while safeguarding technological sovereignty. In practice, this translates into investments in strategic sectors, diversification of supply chains, and strengthening of alliances with like-minded partners such as Japan, South Korea, and the United States. The EU’s de-risking agenda illustrates the delicate equilibrium between willingness and strategic autonomy that defines its broader approach to global competition. As technology becomes a decisive arena of geopolitical rivalry, influence is no longer measured solely by military or economic strength, but by the capacity to innovate, adapt, and shape emerging technological ecosystems. In this sense, Europe’s long-term strategic relevance will depend on its ability to transform vulnerability into strategic resilience through innovation and cooperation in key technological and industrial sectors.

China’s Technological Strategy

While the EU seeks to preserve openness through market-driven innovation and strategic de-risking, Beijing follows a deeply state-driven strategy with initiatives such as Made in China 2025, aiming to become a leader in high-tech industries, reduce dependencies on foreign suppliers, and cultivate national champions through targeted industrial policies. This strategy unfolds across several interconnected dimensions: China has rapidly expanded its innovation and patent capabilities in areas such as  AI and quantum technologies, establishing itself as a leading innovator in emerging industries. In the realm of dual-use and surveillance technologies, innovation often serves both civilian and military applications, underlining the logic of military-civil fusion embedded in state governance. China also dominates the production and processing of strategic materials – from rare earths to magnets and battery components – controlling a large scale of global value chains.

Through its Digital Silk Road, Beijing exports not only digital infrastructure but also governance models, standards, and norms. Therefore, from Europe’s perspective, engaging with China involves interacting with a system in which market logic and state strategy are inseparable, and where technology serves both economic and geopolitical purposes.

The EU’s Response: Cooperation, Regulation, and Autonomy

The EU faces a complex turning point: while still regarding China as a partner on issues such as climate and scientific research, the EU increasingly views it as a systemic rival and source of strategic risk. The core challenge lies in cooperating where possible, while defending critical interests and reducing dependency.  There are still significant areas for collaboration, especially in green technology, climate innovation, and energy transition: Chinese companies play a central role in Europe’s move toward electrification, especially in the electric-vehicle and battery sectors, creating both opportunities and vulnerabilities.

Brussels has adopted a more assertive regulatory approach, introducing measures to safeguard sensitive technologies from foreign interference, including risk assessments in semiconductors, AI, advanced computing, and biotechnology. At the same time, the EU is tightening its scrutiny of Chinese investments, with growing discussions about linking market access to requirements for technology transfer and local value creation. Instead of severing ties, Europe’s de-risking strategy aims to manage interdependence more deliberately and strategically. This approach is supported by major investments in key sectors such as cloud infrastructure, data governance, semiconductors, and critical raw materials. Initiatives like the Eurostack project reflect this broader effort to build digital sovereignty. Yet, as highlighted by the Real Instituto Elcano (2025), the EU still lacks a truly autonomous semiconductor strategy, leaving it at risk of remaining a playground rather than a player in the global tech arena. 

The European Dilemma: Balancing Cooperation and Dependence

Europe faces the fundamental dilemma of how to engage constructively with China without compromising its strategic autonomy. The EU’s identity as an open, rules-based economy often clashes with the need to protect its infrastructure, data, and technologies from strategic vulnerabilities; its regulatory framework, built on transparency, data protection, and fair competition, contrasts with China’s state-driven model.  The EU is able to pursue joint innovation with China in areas of mutual interest, but it must also diversify supply chains and partnerships to avoid overreliance on any single actor. China’s vast state investment in sectors such as batteries, chips, and rare earth processing has left Europe comparatively slow and fragmented in its industrial response. Studies highlight that the European automotive industry, for instance, remains highly dependent on Chinese suppliers for critical battery components. 

EU Member States differ in their approaches to de-risking: some tend to align more closely with Washington, while others preserve more substantial bilateral engagement with Beijing. These divergent positions weaken the coherence and collective leverage of the EU’s China strategy.

The Triangular Game: EU, U.S., and China

The technological rivalry shaping the current century is triangular: the U.S. and China dominate the high-tech landscape, and Europe must carve out a distinct role within this balance. On one hand, Brussels aligns with Washington through the Trade and Technology Council, coordinating export controls and semiconductor policies. On the other hand, it maintains selective cooperation with Beijing on green technology, infrastructure, and scientific research. This dual positioning carries risks because Europe could be drawn too deeply into one camp or sidelined by both. To avoid either, the EU is striving to assert itself as an autonomous geopolitical actor, balancing relations across both sides. Its recent consideration of reciprocity conditions and technology transfer clauses in Chinese foreign direct investment reflects this shift toward strategic assertiveness.

Future Trajectories and Scenarios

Looking toward 2030, three potential scenarios may define the EU–China technological relationship: Scenario A sees Europe successfully develop a robust technological backbone, domestic chip fabrication, diversified supply chains, strong data infrastructure, and clear regulatory standards. It engages with China selectively while maintaining autonomy, emerging as a credible global tech power. Under scenario B, the EU fails to invest adequately, remains dependent on U.S. or Chinese technologies, and struggles with internal coordination. It becomes a market rather than a maker, losing influence over global standards. Scenario C sees Europe pursue selective cooperation with China in areas like green technology while deepening ties with the U.S., Japan, and Korea. This produces a dynamic but delicate equilibrium – engaged and prudent, though not fully sovereign.

Which path prevails will depend on the EU’s investment capacity, political cohesion, supply-chain diversification, and how the U.S.–China rivalry evolves. The war in Ukraine has already intensified European concerns about China’s strategic alignment with Russia, further eroding trust in EU–China relations. Five factors will shape the road ahead: a possible revival of the EU–China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), stricter EU screening of cross-border investments, progress in semiconductors and critical materials, China’s use of rare-earth export controls, and, above all, the EU’s capacity to maintain a unified approach toward China.

Conclusion

The impact of technology and geopolitics is now indisputable. For the EU, the key question is not where to cooperate with China but how to engage without compromising technological sovereignty. Building domestic capabilities, setting standards, developing digital infrastructure, ensuring resilient supply chains, and implementing strategic regulation are indispensable. Europe’s credibility as a global digital power depends on balancing openness with independence andcooperation with governance. The EU can neither ignore the political dimension of technology nor treat China purely as an adversary. The core challenge is to engage intelligently on its own terms.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Maria Grazia Russo focuses on China-Europe relations and has gained academic and professional experience across both regions. She completed a period of study at Hebei Normal University’s School of International Cultural Exchange (国际文化交流学院), followed by work in Shanghai within a consulting firm, exploring issues at the intersection of China’s economy and international affairs. Chinese language skills and a strong engagement with contemporary China are key elements of this background. 

This article was edited by Isabell Raue.

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